What is LDV ?

Who benefits from LDV?

LDV benefits all participants in the securities finance industry.  Lenders are better able to exercise their corporate governance responsibilities and, since lenders recall fewer loans, overall securities lending volume and revenue increase.  Loan, borrow, and collateral portfolios are more stable, allowing agents and brokers to more effectively manage investment, counterparty, and operational risks.  Corporate issuers receive more proxy votes from long-term investors, allowing them to reach quorum more quickly and at lower cost, and counterbalance votes of short-term activists.  Higher loan volumes also improve financial market liquidity and price discovery.

 

What is Lender-Directed Voting, or LDV?

LDV is a new process that matches securities lenders' loaned shares to broker securities that would otherwise go unvoted, enabling lenders to direct proxies without recalling loans.  It substantially improves existing market practices, which require lenders to recall loan in order to vote proxies.  Recalls are inefficient in that they reduce overall lending and borrowing revenue, and create instability in loan, borrow, and collateral portfolios. 

Why haven't lenders voted on loaned shares in the past?

Historically, institutional securities lenders had to forgo voting rights on loaned shares because there was no mechanism to vote without recalls.  Recent technology and transparency improvements in securities finance markets, however, enable loaned shares to be matched with broker shares that would otherwise go unvoted.  In particular, the Agent Lender Disclosure Initiative made apparent the direct counterparty relationship between lenders and broker-borrowers and provided brokers with detailed loan data necessary to include lenders in their proxy allocation routines.

Are there enough unvoted shares to cover lender voting interest?

Approximately 60 billion U.S. equities go unvoted each year[1], while roughly 15 billion shares are on loan[2], suggesting that sufficient votes could be available to meet lender vote demand.  However, it is unlikely that lender voting interest will be fully covered for all issues, such as those with particularly contentious proxy events or that are hard-to-borrow in securities lending markets. 


[1] www.broadridge.com/investor–communications /us/Broadridge_Proxy_Stats_2010.pdf
[2] Data from RMA securities lending composite, assuming $20 average stock price

Does the broker have the lender’s shares on the proxy record date?

1.  U.S. Federal Reserve Regulation T (“Reg T”) defines the permitted purposes for the extension of credit in the borrowing and lending of securities. In general, all of these purposes involve settling trades through re-delivery of the borrowed securities. Most often, the broker’s need to borrow has arisen after failing to receive securities required for an impending trade settlement, either as the result of an operational breakdown or after a short sale.

2.  Given the broker-borrower’s mandatory compliance with Reg T, it can be argued that borrowed shares, which are re-delivered in the settlement of a trade, are not available on the broker’s books (as a technical matter, the position would be held at DTCC) in order to earn voting rights on the proxy record date. However, this argument would only be true per se if the settlement took place on the proxy record date, because an analysis of the ongoing process reveals that the proxy votes, not just the entitled shares, are properly treated as fully fungible on the broker-borrower’s books.

3.  Reg T does not require that the borrowed shares be returned to the original lender when a subsequent receipt of securities is used to offset the original failure-to-receive. At that point, the borrower can certainly return the securities to the original lender. Yet, an active borrower can also compliantly decide to close a loan of the same securities with a different institutional lender whose terms may have become less attractive or from another broker-dealer lender who may be viewed as more likely to recall shares at an inconvenient time in the future, especially if the shares were borrowed for an ongoing short position. Still another reason may exist to hold the securities if the broker considers the return on its cash collateral, received through a rebate from the lender, to be very attractive compared with other investment options. In all those cases, as well as for actively traded issues where there may be a high risk of ongoing settlement failures, the broker can simply keep the newly-received shares in its inventory, balanced against its obligation to the lender.

4. As a result of efficient management of its settlement obligations, a broker – perhaps all brokers – may well have borrowed positions on their books on proxy record dates. The brokers would have gained the right to assign proxies or even to vote at the next corporate meeting as a direct result of the original loans from institutional lenders. In effect, the proxies are fungible on the brokers’ books, along with the borrowed shares themselves subject, of course, to an equitable assignment of proxy rights in compliance with stock exchange rules. Yet, brokers are not expressly permitted to assign proxies to their institutional lenders. At this point, the Lender Directed Voting (“LDV”) argument gains relevance and substance.

5. As noted, in addition to holding the shares cum voting rights, the broker also retains an obligation to its original lender. Indeed, one could argue that an institutional lender's ownership rights are stronger than those of other “beneficial owners” to whom the broker owes shares in the same securities. That is partly due to the distinction that can be drawn between the institutional lenders, who do not receive proxy assignments, and the broker’s own margin customers and hedge fund clients, who do receive proxy assignments. The distinction resides in the timeline of their property rights: the former owned the shares fully prior to lending them to the broker, while the latter required broker-financing in order to acquire their positions. Although we have seen that the institution’s shares may now be on the broker’s books, it is very likely that the financing customers’ shares are out on loan, i.e., hypothecated as collateral to source the broker’s own funding needs. And, in such cases, those positions are truly not in the brokers’ DTC account, although the brokers may well be assigning proxy rights to their accountholders. One can ably argue that those proxies would more equitably be assigned to the institutional lenders.

How can lenders instruct broker shares?

Brokers administer proxy allocation routines to distribute proxies to their customers.  Since broker shares are held in fungible bulk and lenders have beneficial ownership to loaned shares, brokers can include lenders in their allocation routines.  After brokers allocate proxies to lenders, standard proxy processes are followed to garner and submit voting instructions and submit them to corporate issuers.  For example, proxies are assigned to Broadridge accounts designated for the lenders, then are instructed by lenders or ISS on the lenders' behalf.

Could lenders also instruct custodians' unvoted shares?

Regulatory and operational considerations may pose challenges to matching custodians' unvoted shares with lenders’ loan positions.  In particular, custodian shares are not held in fungible bulk, as are broker shares, which presents difficulties when considering custodial allocation of proxies across lender accounts. Furthermore, custodians are not counterparties on loans, so the lenders are not beneficial owners to any of the custodians’ unvoted shares.

Does LDV contribute to “over-reporting,” since lenders’ shares were delivered to new buyers who now have the associated voting rights?

Existing proxy reconciliation processes are sufficient to address any potential "over-reporting" issues.  For example, brokers already use post-reconciliation processes to mitigate the risk of over-reporting that may arise from assigning proxies to margin customers whose shares may have been loaned or rehypothecated.

How do brokers decide which lender(s) are assigned proxies?

Beneficial owners and regulators have expressed concerns about voting opportunities being directed to preferred lenders or leveraged for beneficial loan terms.  In the same way that agent lending queues are designed so that lenders get equitable access to borrower demand, brokers need pre-defined and algorithmic “proxy queues” to ensure equitable assignment of voting opportunities.  Furthermore, on-going auditing and validation of proxy assignments may be needed to ensure against development of a “market for votes.” 

What if proxies are not available from a lender's borrower, but are from another broker?

Reallocation of the loans to brokers with available proxies would increase overall lender voting opportunities.  However, numerous other loan factors would need to be taken into account, such as counterparty risk assessments and credit limits, loan prices, and collateral types and quantity.  Considering these factors, loan reallocations may not be in the overall best interest of lenders and borrowers, and will have to be considered on a case-by-case basis.

How can lenders know, before record date, how many proxies they will be assigned?

To the extent that lenders receive proxies through LDV, they will not have to recall loans to regain voting rights.  However, broker holdings change daily and varying numbers of investors vote, so the number of proxies that can be assigned to lenders cannot be known with certainty until just before the meeting date, which is typically two months after lenders must make record date recall decisions.   The number of available proxies must therefore be forecasted, taking into account factors such as each broker's customer base, the scarcity of shares in the securities lending market, and the expected materiality of proxy ballot items.

Corporate Governance Blog

Monday, November 1, 2021

A Twenty-Year Journey to Transparency

Securities Lending Versus Proxy Voting


Author: David Schwartz J.D. CPA

 

Securities lending has proven the most challenging aspect of shadow banking for regulators to bring under a regulatory rubric. One of the most vexing aspects for regulators has to be how to make securities lenders' decision processes about whether to recall lent securities to vote proxies more transparent to investors and the regulators themselves. The calculus about whether to forego lending income in favor of exercising the right to vote a proxy relies on such myriad factors that regulators are hesitant to second-guess. Nonetheless, investors in lenders like mutual funds have a right to know how investment managers make these decisions. And now, the enormous demand for ESG investing is driving an intensifying interest in how funds are managing governance decisions.[1] 

 

In its latest effort to shed light on fund proxy voting decisions, The Securities and Exchange Commission is expanding the scope of Form N-PX, a disclosure form it now finds never met its potential.[2] But will beefing up N-PX be meaningful to ESG investors, and will it provide any significant evidence about potential conflicts of interest? Or is just more disclosure without context or analysis? Perhaps there is another way to meet these needs, based on technologies not available when N-PX was dreamed up?  

 

A Brief History of Form N-PX

 

Over the past two decades, the Securities and Exchange Commission has tried to shed light on the proxy voting behavior of regulated investment funds. In 2003, the SEC approved rules requiring mutual funds to report their proxy voting data annually on Form N-PX.[2] Currently, Form N-PX requires disclosure of proxy voting information "for each matter relating to a portfolio security considered at any shareholder meeting held during the period covered by the report and for which the registrant was entitled to vote." However, the Form does not require disclosure of the number of shares for which proxies were voted, nor does it require disclosure of portfolio securities on loan when, as is generally the case, the fund is not entitled to vote proxies relating to those securities.[3] 

 

Based on requests from investors and fund advisers alike, the Commission included potential changes to Form N-PX in its July 2010 Proxy Concept Release soliciting comment on expanding the data funds must provide to include the number of shares voted and data on the number of shares out on loan. Also, in November of 2010, the Commission proposed amendments to Form N-PX under Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act requiring certain institutional investment managers to report how they voted on executive compensation matters. However, the concept release resulted in no changes to the content of Form N-PX, and the SEC never finalized the rule proposal.

 

Incomplete Proxy Data Leads Some to Mistaken Conclusions

 

"Don't pay attention to critics. Don't even ignore them" -- Samuel Goldwyn 

 

Since the advent of Form N-PX proxy disclosure, academics and commentators (most with incomplete or faulty data) have scrutinized mutual fund proxy voting practices, turning up the pressure for the SEC to act. For example, in 2006, a team of academic researchers claimed to find evidence of "vote buying" and manipulation of corporate governance in the U.S. equities securities lending markets. Their studies claimed that spikes in equities lending activity on proxy record dates proved unequivocally that abuse by share borrowers was "widespread" and, further, that control of voting rights could be acquired at no cost." This led corporate advocacy groups to call on regulators to force the disclosure of "hidden ownership" by activist hedge funds. 

 

study conducted by the RMA in conjunction with CSFME, however, concluded the data supporting the claims of borrowed proxy abuse was likely incomplete, and failed to account for some key aspects of how the securities lending market and proxy process work (like substitution effects, and proxy allocation controls at the broker level). Lacking proper data, and without considering structural and operational controls currently in place, RMA and CSFME argued that there was no basis on which to conclude from loan volumes around record dates that widespread and abusive empty voting was in fact taking place. In addition, RMA and CSFME called into question the assertion that votes can be acquired for virtually no cost.

 

More recently, academic researchers published papers concluding that passive index funds may operate to the detriment of corporate accountability – and on ESG matters, in particular, pointing the finger at the SEC's rules which have not kept up with these new investor demands.[5] Others claimed to have data-based findings that, faced with economic pressures to lend out their shares or not recall shares, instead of voting, index funds were taking advantage of loose SEC guidance to vote at all hardly. If true, this would potentially violate the duties of these funds to vote proxies and certainly frustrate the ESG desires of shareholders.[6]

 

In Response, the SEC is Beefing up Form N-PX

 

The SEC has turned back to Form N-PX in response to this intense scrutiny of securities lending versus proxy voting. Acknowledging that the current proxy reporting form is not meeting the needs of investors, the  SEC proposed to amend the Form to specifically require funds and managers to disclose how their securities lending activity affected their proxy voting.[7] This 2021 proposal expands the disclosures on Form N-PX well beyond what was considered in the never-finalized 2010 proposal. These statistics are intended to provide transparency about whether a fund chose to recall a security and vote the accompanying proxy or keep the security out on loan in favor of the loan income. 

 

What investors can do with the new information and whether it creates the kind of transparency these decisions require remains to be seen. Will this expanded Form N-PX be just more out-of-context disclosure and meet the same fate as version one from 2003? 

 

New Technology can Provide Better Disclosure

 

Rather than static disclosures on NP-X, investors and regulators need active metrics to monitor funds' proxy voting and identify potential conflicts of interest. In the context of proxy voting versus securities lending decisions, what would be more meaningful is an analysis of the timing of blocking or recall decisions against the significance of the proxy issue and how those correlated against moves in the rebate rate (i.e., the potential profit from the loan) for the security to be voted. Such an analysis was not easily possible back in 2003. But in 2021 with data liberated from isolated silos by cloud computing, distributed ledgers, and blockchains, these kinds of statistical analyses become readily possible given the application of the right technologies.  

 

Perhaps it is in the fund industry's best interest to look into this kind of dynamic analysis to avoid what could be more needless and ultimately unhelpful disclosure to shareholders.  

 

 


 

 

[1] According to one recent Morgan Stanley survey, 95% of millennials and 85% of all investors are now interested in sustainable investing strategies.

 

[2] The stated goals of Form N-PX were to:

  1. "enable fund shareholders to monitor their funds' involvement in the governance activities of portfolio companies." 
  2. "illuminate potential conflicts of interest." 
  3. enable shareholders to "evaluate how closely fund managers follow their state proxy voting policies."

 

[3] The Form arose from a 2002 proposal to require mutual funds to disclose proxy voting policies in their SAI's and their proxy voting records in their annual and semi-annual reports. However, in the final release, the SEC chose to create a new form, N-PX, and a standardized non-calendar annual cycle for proxy vote disclosure rather than in the fund's periodic reports (N-CSR). The 2002 proposal drew 8,000 public comments, a record at the time for any such rulemaking. The N-PX reporting period runs annually from July 1 to June 30 and is still filed on EDGAR in the same unstructured format as in 2003. 

 

[4] Thus, for example, if a fund lends out 99% of its portfolio holdings of XYZ Corporation and therefore votes only 1% of its holdings of XYZ, Form N-PX would disclose that the fund voted proxies for shares of XYZ, but would not also disclose that the fund did not vote 99% of its holdings of XYZ because they were on loan or in a fail-to-receive status.

 

[5] See Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst (Dec. 2019), available at https://columbialawreview.org/content/index-funds-and-the-future-of-corporate-governance-theory-evidence-and-policy/ (finding that an agency-cost analysis shows that index fund managers have a strong incentive to underinvest in stewardship and defer to corporate managers); see also The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism, Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon (May 2013), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2206391see also The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve, John Coates (Sept. 20, 2018), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3247337.

 

[6] Hu, Edwin and Mitts, Joshua and Sylvester, Haley, The Index-Fund Dilemma: An Empirical Study of the Lending-Voting Tradeoff (December 22, 2020). NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 20-52 , Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 647, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3673531 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3673531

 

[7] This includes:

  1. The number of shares that were voted (or, if not known, the number of shares of which votes were instructed to be cast); and
  2. The number of shares that the fund did not recall.
Print

Corporate Outreach Milestones

MILESTONES FOR LENDER DIRECTED VOTING

May 8, 2014: Council of Institutional Investors; - CII Elects New Board, Names Jay Chaudhuri Board Chair. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-31/north-carolina-treasurer-may-cede-pension-control-5-questions.html )

February 2014:  Swiss Minder Initiative implies the value of LDV. http://www.ipe.com/switzerlands-minder-initiative-will-cripple-securities-lending-experts-warn/10000947.article.

January 2014FL SBA begins their SecLending Auction Program with eSecLending.

November 27, 2013 – CSFME staff call with Glass Lewis Chief Operating Officer. He gave his commitment for cooperation and support for LDV, and most importantly, he suggested that perhaps we should discuss with a Broadridge/State Street/Citi the scenario that permits Citi to forward an “Omnibus Ballot” of proxies to State Street, which State Street would then take and assign the proxies to their pension lenders/LDV participants, which would then be incorporated into a single ballot and sent to Broadridge. This eliminates the secondary ballot issue. While this description is oversimplified, Glass Lewis was fairly certain the parties involved could operationally create such a combined ballot. Responding to the question on cost, the Glass Lewis executive stated that the cost depends on the number of voting policies a fund has. Most funds have one policy; therefore, depending on the client, the cost would be $.75 – $2.00 per ballot.

October 21, 2013 – CSFME staff call with ISS Chief Operations Officer. He committed his cooperation and support to advance LDV’s implementation into the markets. He responded to the question about cost: “It depends on the client and the services they use. $6-7 per ballot on average.”

June 25-28, 2013 – CSFME staff attended ICGN Annual Conference in NY, NY. Spoke with executives of CalSTRS; ICGN Chair and Blackrock about LDV.  We received favorable comments and encouragement from each.

June 6, 2013: CSFME meets with Chief Investment Officer for NYC Pension Funds. While very much in favor of the LDV concept, the comments that the NYC Pension Fund Boards are for the most part followers in new initiatives and would prefer a roll-out by other funds first.

April 5, 2013: ‘SEC gives CSFME limited approval for LDV going forward’ providing brokers assign proxies only from their proprietary shares.

March 26, 2013 – CSFME and its legal team presented the case for LDV to SEC Commissioner Dan Gallagher. Present by phone and speaking on behalf of LDV were representatives of FL SBA who spoke about the difficulty of timely recall of shares on loan following release of record date and issues on agenda; and a representative from CalSTRS who spoke about their recall policy affecting income.

March 13, 2013 – CSFME meet staff of Senator Rob Portman and Congressman Steve Stivers of Ohio. These meetings were for the purpose of lining up political support, should the SEC resist the LDV concept. We also met and spoke with CII Deputy Director Amy Borrus for one hour and 15 minutes for a scheduled 30 minute meeting.  She expressed great interest in the value of LDV to long-term beneficial owners.

January 17, 2013 – CSFME conference call with CoPERA Director of Investments.  Among CoPERA’s concerns were: (1) How are agents/brokers notified re: LDV? (2) Who moves or approaches first lender to agent or agent to lender? CSFME responds  that a side letter is needed between lender, agent and broker.

November 8, 2012 – CSFME conference call with Council of Institutional Investors (CII) detailing LDV. Some in attendance were opposed to securities lending because of their desire to vote 100% of recall. This position would be irrelevant giving CalSTRS’ change to policy on proxy recall.

October 24, 2012, 2PM – CSFME presents LDV to Broadridge Institutional Investor Group. At this meeting, a representative of CalSTRS states: “We would view brokers willing to provide proxies more favorably than those who would not.” We were also informed by CalSTRS that they were looking to change their 100% recall policy. A representative of SWIB led a discussion on International Voting Issues, and apparently was chairing 3 meetings to determine the following: 1. who is voting internationally? 2. What are the issues in the international markets? 3. How do we increase and improve international processes?

October 24, 2012, 11AM – EWB/KT conference call with ICGN.  Executives stated that the argument for LDV may not be as strong in a non-record date market, and asked what would be the cost for LDV.  They further stated that they would like to see the U.S. go with LDV first and would need more information and operational detail.

October 13, 2012 email note from Elizabeth Danese Mozely to Broadridge’s Institutional Investor Working Group: “TerriJo Saarela, State of Wisconsin Investment Board, will provide commentary on their fund’s interest in international voting and an update on her participation in the Council of Institutional Investors’ working group on international voting.  Our discussion will include the differences in process for voting abroad, share blocking, attendance at the meeting via proxy or Power of Attorney (POA), best practices available through the various laws and regulations, etc.”

September 18, 2012: CSFME contacts Blackrock/ICGN Chair for a brief on LDV.

August 13, 2012 – CSFME conference call with OTPP.  Discussion of LDV was not timely in that their SecLending Program stopped lending securities through agents in mid-2006. State Street is their custodian and they were using a tri-party repo through Chase to Lehman, until the Lehman collapse. All the assets sat at Chase. It was not clear who had voting rights. At the time of this discussion in August 2012, OTPP was thinking formulating an SLA because they do not have the capacity to lend securities on their own. We have had no discussion with them since.

August 2, 2012 – CSFME contacts Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTPP) regarding LDV.

March 19, 2012 – CSFME conference call with executive in charge of securities lending for Franklin Templeton

February 22, 2012ICGN sends LDV letter of support to the SEC, signed by Chairman of the ICGN Board of Governors.

September 30, 2011CalSTRS sends LDV letter of support to the SEC, signed by Director of Corporate Governance Anne Sheehan.

July 18, 2011Florida SBA sends LDV letter of support to the SEC, signed by Executive Director and Chief Investment Officer.

November 2011 – CSFME introduces Council of Institutional Investors editor to LDV.

July 5, 2011 – CSFME sends a Comment Letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission regarding LDV.

October 2010 – CSFME releases report: Borrowed Proxy Abuse: Real or Not? This report and the SEC’s Securities Lending and Short Selling Roundtable prompted the question from beneficial owners and regulators regarding the need to recall shares on loan to vote proxies, why can’t lenders receive proxies for shares on loan when we get the dividends? From this question, the idea for Lender Directed Voting was born.

January 2010 – SEC issues rules that brokers no longer have the discretion to vote their customers’ shares held in companies without receiving voting instructions from those customers about how to vote them in an election of directors. http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/votingrules2010.htm. The rule, periodically, contributed to the difficulty of corporate meetings attaining a quorum.

Fall 2009/2010 – Four public pension funds join CSFME in Empty Voting studies/LDV initiative; FL SBA, CalSTRS, SWIB and CoPERA.

September 29-30, 2009 - SEC Announces Panelists for Securities Lending and Short Sale Roundtable; http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-207.htm