What is LDV ?

Who benefits from LDV?

LDV benefits all participants in the securities finance industry.  Lenders are better able to exercise their corporate governance responsibilities and, since lenders recall fewer loans, overall securities lending volume and revenue increase.  Loan, borrow, and collateral portfolios are more stable, allowing agents and brokers to more effectively manage investment, counterparty, and operational risks.  Corporate issuers receive more proxy votes from long-term investors, allowing them to reach quorum more quickly and at lower cost, and counterbalance votes of short-term activists.  Higher loan volumes also improve financial market liquidity and price discovery.

 

What is Lender-Directed Voting, or LDV?

LDV is a new process that matches securities lenders' loaned shares to broker securities that would otherwise go unvoted, enabling lenders to direct proxies without recalling loans.  It substantially improves existing market practices, which require lenders to recall loan in order to vote proxies.  Recalls are inefficient in that they reduce overall lending and borrowing revenue, and create instability in loan, borrow, and collateral portfolios. 

Why haven't lenders voted on loaned shares in the past?

Historically, institutional securities lenders had to forgo voting rights on loaned shares because there was no mechanism to vote without recalls.  Recent technology and transparency improvements in securities finance markets, however, enable loaned shares to be matched with broker shares that would otherwise go unvoted.  In particular, the Agent Lender Disclosure Initiative made apparent the direct counterparty relationship between lenders and broker-borrowers and provided brokers with detailed loan data necessary to include lenders in their proxy allocation routines.

Are there enough unvoted shares to cover lender voting interest?

Approximately 60 billion U.S. equities go unvoted each year[1], while roughly 15 billion shares are on loan[2], suggesting that sufficient votes could be available to meet lender vote demand.  However, it is unlikely that lender voting interest will be fully covered for all issues, such as those with particularly contentious proxy events or that are hard-to-borrow in securities lending markets. 


[1] www.broadridge.com/investor–communications /us/Broadridge_Proxy_Stats_2010.pdf
[2] Data from RMA securities lending composite, assuming $20 average stock price

Does the broker have the lender’s shares on the proxy record date?

1.  U.S. Federal Reserve Regulation T (“Reg T”) defines the permitted purposes for the extension of credit in the borrowing and lending of securities. In general, all of these purposes involve settling trades through re-delivery of the borrowed securities. Most often, the broker’s need to borrow has arisen after failing to receive securities required for an impending trade settlement, either as the result of an operational breakdown or after a short sale.

2.  Given the broker-borrower’s mandatory compliance with Reg T, it can be argued that borrowed shares, which are re-delivered in the settlement of a trade, are not available on the broker’s books (as a technical matter, the position would be held at DTCC) in order to earn voting rights on the proxy record date. However, this argument would only be true per se if the settlement took place on the proxy record date, because an analysis of the ongoing process reveals that the proxy votes, not just the entitled shares, are properly treated as fully fungible on the broker-borrower’s books.

3.  Reg T does not require that the borrowed shares be returned to the original lender when a subsequent receipt of securities is used to offset the original failure-to-receive. At that point, the borrower can certainly return the securities to the original lender. Yet, an active borrower can also compliantly decide to close a loan of the same securities with a different institutional lender whose terms may have become less attractive or from another broker-dealer lender who may be viewed as more likely to recall shares at an inconvenient time in the future, especially if the shares were borrowed for an ongoing short position. Still another reason may exist to hold the securities if the broker considers the return on its cash collateral, received through a rebate from the lender, to be very attractive compared with other investment options. In all those cases, as well as for actively traded issues where there may be a high risk of ongoing settlement failures, the broker can simply keep the newly-received shares in its inventory, balanced against its obligation to the lender.

4. As a result of efficient management of its settlement obligations, a broker – perhaps all brokers – may well have borrowed positions on their books on proxy record dates. The brokers would have gained the right to assign proxies or even to vote at the next corporate meeting as a direct result of the original loans from institutional lenders. In effect, the proxies are fungible on the brokers’ books, along with the borrowed shares themselves subject, of course, to an equitable assignment of proxy rights in compliance with stock exchange rules. Yet, brokers are not expressly permitted to assign proxies to their institutional lenders. At this point, the Lender Directed Voting (“LDV”) argument gains relevance and substance.

5. As noted, in addition to holding the shares cum voting rights, the broker also retains an obligation to its original lender. Indeed, one could argue that an institutional lender's ownership rights are stronger than those of other “beneficial owners” to whom the broker owes shares in the same securities. That is partly due to the distinction that can be drawn between the institutional lenders, who do not receive proxy assignments, and the broker’s own margin customers and hedge fund clients, who do receive proxy assignments. The distinction resides in the timeline of their property rights: the former owned the shares fully prior to lending them to the broker, while the latter required broker-financing in order to acquire their positions. Although we have seen that the institution’s shares may now be on the broker’s books, it is very likely that the financing customers’ shares are out on loan, i.e., hypothecated as collateral to source the broker’s own funding needs. And, in such cases, those positions are truly not in the brokers’ DTC account, although the brokers may well be assigning proxy rights to their accountholders. One can ably argue that those proxies would more equitably be assigned to the institutional lenders.

How can lenders instruct broker shares?

Brokers administer proxy allocation routines to distribute proxies to their customers.  Since broker shares are held in fungible bulk and lenders have beneficial ownership to loaned shares, brokers can include lenders in their allocation routines.  After brokers allocate proxies to lenders, standard proxy processes are followed to garner and submit voting instructions and submit them to corporate issuers.  For example, proxies are assigned to Broadridge accounts designated for the lenders, then are instructed by lenders or ISS on the lenders' behalf.

Could lenders also instruct custodians' unvoted shares?

Regulatory and operational considerations may pose challenges to matching custodians' unvoted shares with lenders’ loan positions.  In particular, custodian shares are not held in fungible bulk, as are broker shares, which presents difficulties when considering custodial allocation of proxies across lender accounts. Furthermore, custodians are not counterparties on loans, so the lenders are not beneficial owners to any of the custodians’ unvoted shares.

Does LDV contribute to “over-reporting,” since lenders’ shares were delivered to new buyers who now have the associated voting rights?

Existing proxy reconciliation processes are sufficient to address any potential "over-reporting" issues.  For example, brokers already use post-reconciliation processes to mitigate the risk of over-reporting that may arise from assigning proxies to margin customers whose shares may have been loaned or rehypothecated.

How do brokers decide which lender(s) are assigned proxies?

Beneficial owners and regulators have expressed concerns about voting opportunities being directed to preferred lenders or leveraged for beneficial loan terms.  In the same way that agent lending queues are designed so that lenders get equitable access to borrower demand, brokers need pre-defined and algorithmic “proxy queues” to ensure equitable assignment of voting opportunities.  Furthermore, on-going auditing and validation of proxy assignments may be needed to ensure against development of a “market for votes.” 

What if proxies are not available from a lender's borrower, but are from another broker?

Reallocation of the loans to brokers with available proxies would increase overall lender voting opportunities.  However, numerous other loan factors would need to be taken into account, such as counterparty risk assessments and credit limits, loan prices, and collateral types and quantity.  Considering these factors, loan reallocations may not be in the overall best interest of lenders and borrowers, and will have to be considered on a case-by-case basis.

How can lenders know, before record date, how many proxies they will be assigned?

To the extent that lenders receive proxies through LDV, they will not have to recall loans to regain voting rights.  However, broker holdings change daily and varying numbers of investors vote, so the number of proxies that can be assigned to lenders cannot be known with certainty until just before the meeting date, which is typically two months after lenders must make record date recall decisions.   The number of available proxies must therefore be forecasted, taking into account factors such as each broker's customer base, the scarcity of shares in the securities lending market, and the expected materiality of proxy ballot items.

Corporate Governance Blog

Saturday, October 8, 2022

Bringing Crypto Asset Activities Into the Regulatory Perimeter

Tech Innovation Meets Prudential Regulation


Author: David Schwartz J.D. CPA

A collection of the globe's most significant securities trade associations[1] joined forces to file a comprehensive response to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's (BCBS) second public consultation on the prudential treatment of banks' crypto-asset exposures. The September 30, 2022, letter voiced support for the design of the crypto-asset exposure framework proposed by BIS in its June 10, 2021, initial and follow-up June 30, 2022, consultations. However, the associations identified some elements of the proposal that they say "would  meaningfully  reduce banks' ability  to—and  in  some  cases  effectively  preclude banks  from—utilising the benefits of distributed ledger technology ("DLT") to perform certain  traditional  banking, financial  intermediation and  other  financial functions  more efficiently."

 

Aimed at addressing issues raised by respondents to the initial consultation, the BIS's second release retains the basic structure of the proposal in the first consultation, with crypto assets divided into two broad groups: 

 

  1. Group 1 includes those eligible for treatment under the existing Basel Framework with some modifications. [2]

  2. Group 2 includes unbacked crypto assets and stablecoins with ineffective stabilization mechanisms, subject to a new conservative prudential treatment.

 

The second consultation adds detail to the proposed groups and standards. It also includes new elements, such as an infrastructure risk add-on to cover distributed ledger technologies' latest and evolving risks, adjustments to increase risk sensitivity, and an overall gross limit on Group 2 crypto assets. It also proposes introducing an exposure limit that, if adopted, would initially limit a bank's total exposures to Group 2 crypto assets to 1% of Tier 1 capital.

 

 

The associations argue that recent volatility in crypto-asset markets has underscored that without prudential regulation, excess leverage, insufficient liquidity, and lack of capital make crypto unsuitable for banks and financial institutions. However, bringing crypto assets under a prudential regulatory rubric would free traditional financial institutions to use the technologies, employ crypto assets, and offer them and related services to their investors, customers, and clients. 

 

"Allowing appropriately risk-managed cryptoasset banking and other financial activities to take place within the regulatory perimeter should be a central goal of the final Basel Committee standards." 

 

 "A prudential framework that permits banks to support the growth of crypto assets benefits supervisors by providing better insight into the evolution and growth of these activities (e.g., by requiring the reporting of crypto asset exposures). At the same time, customers and investors will benefit from more transparent, trusted alternatives and the protections of fully regulated institutions providing services.

 

Leaving crypto asset markets and services outside of the prudential regulatory framework would cede these markets and services, they say, to the virtual "wild west" of unregulated and underregulated players, to the detriment of investors and market stability.

 

"Otherwise, un- and -lesser-regulated entities are likely to be predominant providers of cryptoasset-related services. The result would be an unlevel playing field and a lack of transparency in the build-up of leverage and risk in the financial system outside the regulatory perimeter. In that case, the absence of regulated financial institutions engaging in cryptoasset-related activities would be net worse than if banks were providing these services subject to an appropriately calibrated framework."

 

Adapting the Current Prudential Framework

The associations made three main recommendations to BIS to bring crypto assets into the prudential framework. 

  1. Keep the "same risk, same activity, same treatment" approach. Cryptoassets with equivalent economics and risks as traditional assets "should be subject to the same capital, liquidity and other requirements as the traditional asset;" 

  2. Take a "technology risk-neutral" approach (i.e., do not create infrastructure risk add-ons); and 

  3. Instead of pre-approving each particular crypto asset, supervisors should clearly define classification criteria for crypto assets for banks to apply. 

 

Some novel solutions and alterations to the current prudential framework would be necessary, say the associations, to accommodate the risk profiles of both Group 1 and Group 2 crypto assets. Financial institutions are eager to integrate not just crypto assets into their processes and offerings but also port over some of the technologies pioneered and tested in the crypto markets into their trading and clearing systems. Calibrating prudential standards and weighing risks associated with banks' use of crypto assets must take into consideration mitigating factors like the effects DLT, smart contracts, and blockchain databases would have, like reduced or instantaneous transaction times, wringing some risks associated with margins and counterparty credit risks out of the market by virtue of the technology alone. 

 

"Getting this right is critical to meet customer demand and harness the benefits of DLT and similar technologies. For example, the speed by and transparency with which transactions can be recorded using DLT, combined with the ability to swap and record assets and cash simultaneously, would help mitigate counterparty, liquidity and settlement risk, allow transactions to settle, and funds and assets to reach their intended recipient, faster and allow for efficiencies in collateral management."

 

As these technologies become more commonly employed, financial firms can apply tech-based risk-reduction to areas outside the crypto asset context. For example, as we have discussed, in the context of securities lending, regulatory bank capital charges are making it uneconomical for bank lending agents to provide borrower default indemnity to clients. However, we have also posited that if technologies like DLT could bring more transparency to securities lending, allowing lenders to screen better and monitor borrowers, the reductions to counterparty credit risk could be significant. 

 

"[f]intech advances in the application of SFTR datasets through distributed ledger technologies (DLT) may also bring more transparency to securities lending transactions. DLT opens the possibility that lending agents can give their concerned lenders the ability to a) screen their ultimate borrowers, b) limit their trades and c) give assurances that borrowed shares are not being used for purposes that are counter to the lender's own ESG principles. And, if the borrower is a broker-dealer, then non-directed and unvoted shares in the firm's depository account can be assigned to the ESG-compliant lenders, either for a fee or for preferential access to deep and desirable stock pools."

 

As with crypto assets, BIS may consider reevaluating the best way to set bank capital charges for borrower indemnity, given the reduced risk environment in a new technological landscape of rapid clearing and real-time data sharing and regulatory reporting. 

 

In fact, the associations included in their comment letter a request for assurances that securities finance transactions (SFT) would not be swept into the standardized approach for credit risk simply by virtue of employing blockchain or DLT. Rather, if the SFT, though transacted through a blockchain, consists solely of traditional assets, it should remain under the comprehensive approach and not be swept into the rubric of group classifications for crypto assets. 

 

 "[T]he Second  Consultation  states  that,  for  SFTs,  banks  should  apply the comprehensive  approach  formula  used in  the  standardised  approach  to  credit  risk. See SCO60.98. The Associations seek confirmation from the Basel Committee that an SFT or margin loan relating solely to traditional assets, even if the SFT is executed on a platform that  uses  the  blockchain,  would  be  eligible  for  the  comprehensive  approach  to  the  same extent  as  any  other  SFT or  margin  loan involving  traditional  assets,  including  the recognition of eligible collateral. An SFT or margin loan that relates partially or wholly to Group  1a,  Group  1b,  and  Group  2a  cryptoassets  would  similarly  qualify  for  the comprehensive  approach  to  the  same  extent  as  any  other  SFT or  margin  loan involving traditional  assets,  subject  of  course  to  any  limitations  on  the  recognition  of  the  relevant cryptoassets as eligible collateral."

 

 

Conclusion

Given the changes made from the first consultation to the second, it seems that BIS is paying close attention to the feedback received. This latest input from the world's most influential securities trade association contains cogent suggestions that, if taken seriously, could help to (i) promote the adoption and benefits of DLT use, (ii) facilitate regulated banks' engagement in the crypto asset markets and (iii) improve investor protection by leveling the global regulatory "playing field." 

 


 

[1] The comment letter consortium consisted of The Global Financial Markets Association, 1the Futures Industry Association, the Institute of  International  Finance,  the  International  Swaps and  Derivatives  Association,  the International Securities Lending Association, the Bank Policy Institute, the International Capital Markets  Association,  and the  Financial  Services  Forum.

 

[2] Following the framework's overarching principle that prudential regulation of crypto assets should be technology neutral and based upon the risks and functions of crypto assets. In essence: "Same risk, same activity, same treatment."  "A crypto asset that provides equivalent economic functions and poses the same risks as a 'traditional asset' should be subject to the  same  capital,  liquidity  and  other  requirements  as  the  traditional  asset." Computers and money: the work of the Basel Committee on crypto assets

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Corporate Outreach Milestones

MILESTONES FOR LENDER DIRECTED VOTING

May 8, 2014: Council of Institutional Investors; - CII Elects New Board, Names Jay Chaudhuri Board Chair. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-31/north-carolina-treasurer-may-cede-pension-control-5-questions.html )

February 2014:  Swiss Minder Initiative implies the value of LDV. http://www.ipe.com/switzerlands-minder-initiative-will-cripple-securities-lending-experts-warn/10000947.article.

January 2014FL SBA begins their SecLending Auction Program with eSecLending.

November 27, 2013 – CSFME staff call with Glass Lewis Chief Operating Officer. He gave his commitment for cooperation and support for LDV, and most importantly, he suggested that perhaps we should discuss with a Broadridge/State Street/Citi the scenario that permits Citi to forward an “Omnibus Ballot” of proxies to State Street, which State Street would then take and assign the proxies to their pension lenders/LDV participants, which would then be incorporated into a single ballot and sent to Broadridge. This eliminates the secondary ballot issue. While this description is oversimplified, Glass Lewis was fairly certain the parties involved could operationally create such a combined ballot. Responding to the question on cost, the Glass Lewis executive stated that the cost depends on the number of voting policies a fund has. Most funds have one policy; therefore, depending on the client, the cost would be $.75 – $2.00 per ballot.

October 21, 2013 – CSFME staff call with ISS Chief Operations Officer. He committed his cooperation and support to advance LDV’s implementation into the markets. He responded to the question about cost: “It depends on the client and the services they use. $6-7 per ballot on average.”

June 25-28, 2013 – CSFME staff attended ICGN Annual Conference in NY, NY. Spoke with executives of CalSTRS; ICGN Chair and Blackrock about LDV.  We received favorable comments and encouragement from each.

June 6, 2013: CSFME meets with Chief Investment Officer for NYC Pension Funds. While very much in favor of the LDV concept, the comments that the NYC Pension Fund Boards are for the most part followers in new initiatives and would prefer a roll-out by other funds first.

April 5, 2013: ‘SEC gives CSFME limited approval for LDV going forward’ providing brokers assign proxies only from their proprietary shares.

March 26, 2013 – CSFME and its legal team presented the case for LDV to SEC Commissioner Dan Gallagher. Present by phone and speaking on behalf of LDV were representatives of FL SBA who spoke about the difficulty of timely recall of shares on loan following release of record date and issues on agenda; and a representative from CalSTRS who spoke about their recall policy affecting income.

March 13, 2013 – CSFME meet staff of Senator Rob Portman and Congressman Steve Stivers of Ohio. These meetings were for the purpose of lining up political support, should the SEC resist the LDV concept. We also met and spoke with CII Deputy Director Amy Borrus for one hour and 15 minutes for a scheduled 30 minute meeting.  She expressed great interest in the value of LDV to long-term beneficial owners.

January 17, 2013 – CSFME conference call with CoPERA Director of Investments.  Among CoPERA’s concerns were: (1) How are agents/brokers notified re: LDV? (2) Who moves or approaches first lender to agent or agent to lender? CSFME responds  that a side letter is needed between lender, agent and broker.

November 8, 2012 – CSFME conference call with Council of Institutional Investors (CII) detailing LDV. Some in attendance were opposed to securities lending because of their desire to vote 100% of recall. This position would be irrelevant giving CalSTRS’ change to policy on proxy recall.

October 24, 2012, 2PM – CSFME presents LDV to Broadridge Institutional Investor Group. At this meeting, a representative of CalSTRS states: “We would view brokers willing to provide proxies more favorably than those who would not.” We were also informed by CalSTRS that they were looking to change their 100% recall policy. A representative of SWIB led a discussion on International Voting Issues, and apparently was chairing 3 meetings to determine the following: 1. who is voting internationally? 2. What are the issues in the international markets? 3. How do we increase and improve international processes?

October 24, 2012, 11AM – EWB/KT conference call with ICGN.  Executives stated that the argument for LDV may not be as strong in a non-record date market, and asked what would be the cost for LDV.  They further stated that they would like to see the U.S. go with LDV first and would need more information and operational detail.

October 13, 2012 email note from Elizabeth Danese Mozely to Broadridge’s Institutional Investor Working Group: “TerriJo Saarela, State of Wisconsin Investment Board, will provide commentary on their fund’s interest in international voting and an update on her participation in the Council of Institutional Investors’ working group on international voting.  Our discussion will include the differences in process for voting abroad, share blocking, attendance at the meeting via proxy or Power of Attorney (POA), best practices available through the various laws and regulations, etc.”

September 18, 2012: CSFME contacts Blackrock/ICGN Chair for a brief on LDV.

August 13, 2012 – CSFME conference call with OTPP.  Discussion of LDV was not timely in that their SecLending Program stopped lending securities through agents in mid-2006. State Street is their custodian and they were using a tri-party repo through Chase to Lehman, until the Lehman collapse. All the assets sat at Chase. It was not clear who had voting rights. At the time of this discussion in August 2012, OTPP was thinking formulating an SLA because they do not have the capacity to lend securities on their own. We have had no discussion with them since.

August 2, 2012 – CSFME contacts Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTPP) regarding LDV.

March 19, 2012 – CSFME conference call with executive in charge of securities lending for Franklin Templeton

February 22, 2012ICGN sends LDV letter of support to the SEC, signed by Chairman of the ICGN Board of Governors.

September 30, 2011CalSTRS sends LDV letter of support to the SEC, signed by Director of Corporate Governance Anne Sheehan.

July 18, 2011Florida SBA sends LDV letter of support to the SEC, signed by Executive Director and Chief Investment Officer.

November 2011 – CSFME introduces Council of Institutional Investors editor to LDV.

July 5, 2011 – CSFME sends a Comment Letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission regarding LDV.

October 2010 – CSFME releases report: Borrowed Proxy Abuse: Real or Not? This report and the SEC’s Securities Lending and Short Selling Roundtable prompted the question from beneficial owners and regulators regarding the need to recall shares on loan to vote proxies, why can’t lenders receive proxies for shares on loan when we get the dividends? From this question, the idea for Lender Directed Voting was born.

January 2010 – SEC issues rules that brokers no longer have the discretion to vote their customers’ shares held in companies without receiving voting instructions from those customers about how to vote them in an election of directors. http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/votingrules2010.htm. The rule, periodically, contributed to the difficulty of corporate meetings attaining a quorum.

Fall 2009/2010 – Four public pension funds join CSFME in Empty Voting studies/LDV initiative; FL SBA, CalSTRS, SWIB and CoPERA.

September 29-30, 2009 - SEC Announces Panelists for Securities Lending and Short Sale Roundtable; http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-207.htm