What is LDV ?

Who benefits from LDV?

LDV benefits all participants in the securities finance industry.  Lenders are better able to exercise their corporate governance responsibilities and, since lenders recall fewer loans, overall securities lending volume and revenue increase.  Loan, borrow, and collateral portfolios are more stable, allowing agents and brokers to more effectively manage investment, counterparty, and operational risks.  Corporate issuers receive more proxy votes from long-term investors, allowing them to reach quorum more quickly and at lower cost, and counterbalance votes of short-term activists.  Higher loan volumes also improve financial market liquidity and price discovery.

 

What is Lender-Directed Voting, or LDV?

LDV is a new process that matches securities lenders' loaned shares to broker securities that would otherwise go unvoted, enabling lenders to direct proxies without recalling loans.  It substantially improves existing market practices, which require lenders to recall loan in order to vote proxies.  Recalls are inefficient in that they reduce overall lending and borrowing revenue, and create instability in loan, borrow, and collateral portfolios. 

Why haven't lenders voted on loaned shares in the past?

Historically, institutional securities lenders had to forgo voting rights on loaned shares because there was no mechanism to vote without recalls.  Recent technology and transparency improvements in securities finance markets, however, enable loaned shares to be matched with broker shares that would otherwise go unvoted.  In particular, the Agent Lender Disclosure Initiative made apparent the direct counterparty relationship between lenders and broker-borrowers and provided brokers with detailed loan data necessary to include lenders in their proxy allocation routines.

Are there enough unvoted shares to cover lender voting interest?

Approximately 60 billion U.S. equities go unvoted each year[1], while roughly 15 billion shares are on loan[2], suggesting that sufficient votes could be available to meet lender vote demand.  However, it is unlikely that lender voting interest will be fully covered for all issues, such as those with particularly contentious proxy events or that are hard-to-borrow in securities lending markets. 


[1] www.broadridge.com/investor–communications /us/Broadridge_Proxy_Stats_2010.pdf
[2] Data from RMA securities lending composite, assuming $20 average stock price

Does the broker have the lender’s shares on the proxy record date?

1.  U.S. Federal Reserve Regulation T (“Reg T”) defines the permitted purposes for the extension of credit in the borrowing and lending of securities. In general, all of these purposes involve settling trades through re-delivery of the borrowed securities. Most often, the broker’s need to borrow has arisen after failing to receive securities required for an impending trade settlement, either as the result of an operational breakdown or after a short sale.

2.  Given the broker-borrower’s mandatory compliance with Reg T, it can be argued that borrowed shares, which are re-delivered in the settlement of a trade, are not available on the broker’s books (as a technical matter, the position would be held at DTCC) in order to earn voting rights on the proxy record date. However, this argument would only be true per se if the settlement took place on the proxy record date, because an analysis of the ongoing process reveals that the proxy votes, not just the entitled shares, are properly treated as fully fungible on the broker-borrower’s books.

3.  Reg T does not require that the borrowed shares be returned to the original lender when a subsequent receipt of securities is used to offset the original failure-to-receive. At that point, the borrower can certainly return the securities to the original lender. Yet, an active borrower can also compliantly decide to close a loan of the same securities with a different institutional lender whose terms may have become less attractive or from another broker-dealer lender who may be viewed as more likely to recall shares at an inconvenient time in the future, especially if the shares were borrowed for an ongoing short position. Still another reason may exist to hold the securities if the broker considers the return on its cash collateral, received through a rebate from the lender, to be very attractive compared with other investment options. In all those cases, as well as for actively traded issues where there may be a high risk of ongoing settlement failures, the broker can simply keep the newly-received shares in its inventory, balanced against its obligation to the lender.

4. As a result of efficient management of its settlement obligations, a broker – perhaps all brokers – may well have borrowed positions on their books on proxy record dates. The brokers would have gained the right to assign proxies or even to vote at the next corporate meeting as a direct result of the original loans from institutional lenders. In effect, the proxies are fungible on the brokers’ books, along with the borrowed shares themselves subject, of course, to an equitable assignment of proxy rights in compliance with stock exchange rules. Yet, brokers are not expressly permitted to assign proxies to their institutional lenders. At this point, the Lender Directed Voting (“LDV”) argument gains relevance and substance.

5. As noted, in addition to holding the shares cum voting rights, the broker also retains an obligation to its original lender. Indeed, one could argue that an institutional lender's ownership rights are stronger than those of other “beneficial owners” to whom the broker owes shares in the same securities. That is partly due to the distinction that can be drawn between the institutional lenders, who do not receive proxy assignments, and the broker’s own margin customers and hedge fund clients, who do receive proxy assignments. The distinction resides in the timeline of their property rights: the former owned the shares fully prior to lending them to the broker, while the latter required broker-financing in order to acquire their positions. Although we have seen that the institution’s shares may now be on the broker’s books, it is very likely that the financing customers’ shares are out on loan, i.e., hypothecated as collateral to source the broker’s own funding needs. And, in such cases, those positions are truly not in the brokers’ DTC account, although the brokers may well be assigning proxy rights to their accountholders. One can ably argue that those proxies would more equitably be assigned to the institutional lenders.

How can lenders instruct broker shares?

Brokers administer proxy allocation routines to distribute proxies to their customers.  Since broker shares are held in fungible bulk and lenders have beneficial ownership to loaned shares, brokers can include lenders in their allocation routines.  After brokers allocate proxies to lenders, standard proxy processes are followed to garner and submit voting instructions and submit them to corporate issuers.  For example, proxies are assigned to Broadridge accounts designated for the lenders, then are instructed by lenders or ISS on the lenders' behalf.

Could lenders also instruct custodians' unvoted shares?

Regulatory and operational considerations may pose challenges to matching custodians' unvoted shares with lenders’ loan positions.  In particular, custodian shares are not held in fungible bulk, as are broker shares, which presents difficulties when considering custodial allocation of proxies across lender accounts. Furthermore, custodians are not counterparties on loans, so the lenders are not beneficial owners to any of the custodians’ unvoted shares.

Does LDV contribute to “over-reporting,” since lenders’ shares were delivered to new buyers who now have the associated voting rights?

Existing proxy reconciliation processes are sufficient to address any potential "over-reporting" issues.  For example, brokers already use post-reconciliation processes to mitigate the risk of over-reporting that may arise from assigning proxies to margin customers whose shares may have been loaned or rehypothecated.

How do brokers decide which lender(s) are assigned proxies?

Beneficial owners and regulators have expressed concerns about voting opportunities being directed to preferred lenders or leveraged for beneficial loan terms.  In the same way that agent lending queues are designed so that lenders get equitable access to borrower demand, brokers need pre-defined and algorithmic “proxy queues” to ensure equitable assignment of voting opportunities.  Furthermore, on-going auditing and validation of proxy assignments may be needed to ensure against development of a “market for votes.” 

What if proxies are not available from a lender's borrower, but are from another broker?

Reallocation of the loans to brokers with available proxies would increase overall lender voting opportunities.  However, numerous other loan factors would need to be taken into account, such as counterparty risk assessments and credit limits, loan prices, and collateral types and quantity.  Considering these factors, loan reallocations may not be in the overall best interest of lenders and borrowers, and will have to be considered on a case-by-case basis.

How can lenders know, before record date, how many proxies they will be assigned?

To the extent that lenders receive proxies through LDV, they will not have to recall loans to regain voting rights.  However, broker holdings change daily and varying numbers of investors vote, so the number of proxies that can be assigned to lenders cannot be known with certainty until just before the meeting date, which is typically two months after lenders must make record date recall decisions.   The number of available proxies must therefore be forecasted, taking into account factors such as each broker's customer base, the scarcity of shares in the securities lending market, and the expected materiality of proxy ballot items.

Corporate Governance Blog

Friday, February 11, 2022

How Would Cross-Border Payments Change in a Digital Currency World?

World Bank, BIS and SWIFT weigh in on CBDCs


Author: David Schwartz J.D. CPA

 

Widespread adoption of central bank digital currencies (CBDC) could revolutionize cross-border payments by reducing friction and making it possible for T+1 or even T+0 settlement of cross-border trades. The Fed’s Digital Currency discussion paper is the central bank’s first step in a public discussion with stakeholders about a digital dollar, as we described in our January 25 post. But what would such a cross-border payment system look like? Is it enough to mimic the traditional systems of SWIFT, DTCC, and others? Or does the unprecedented interoperability and technology of CBDCs force obsolesce on the current systems? 

With some countries, most notably China, having already adopted digital versions of their national currencies and many more sovereignties in catch-up mode, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the World Bank have started envisioning what cross-border transactions would look like in a CBDC world. They theorize potential CBDC systems for cross-border payments could take several forms. Each of these could reduce many aspects of the friction and inefficiencies inherent in current cross-border payment systems through fewer intermediaries, better integration and technical compatibility, and mitigation of cross-border and cross-currency risks.1

 

What are the Cross-border CBDC Models Being Considered?

 

In a pair of reports2, the World Bank and BIS jointly posit three different models for integrating CBDCs into cross-border payment systems. 

 
  • Compatible CBDC Systems Model - Setting common international standards would permit the interoperability of separate CBDC systems.3 This model resembles traditional cross-border payment arrangements. Common technical standards, such as message formats, cryptographic techniques, data requirements, and user interfaces can reduce the operational burden on financial institutions for participating in multiple systems. 

Source: Report To The G20: Central Bank Digital Currencies For Cross-Border Payments

 

  • Interlinked CBDC Systems Model - A shared technical interface, supported by contractual agreements between the systems, allows participants – either retail or wholesale – in one system to make payments to those in another. A common clearing mechanism takes a different approach by linking systems through designated settlement accounts.

Source: Report To The G20: Central Bank Digital Currencies For Cross-Border Payments

 

  • Single system for multi-central bank digital currency multi-CBDC -  This model posits a single CBDC system across jurisdictions. The concept builds on having a single set of rules, a single technical system, and a single set of participants. It implies cooperation of a higher magnitude among central banks. This deeper integration allows for potentially more operational functionality and efficiency but increases the governance and control hurdles.

Source: Report To The G20: Central Bank Digital Currencies For Cross-Border Payments

 
 
Each of these models has its own strengths and weaknesses. But all of them rely on strong interoperability, which could, in turn, introduce a whole host of security, privacy, and anti-money-laundering challenges. These challenges are not new or insurmountable, just different, according to Thomas Zschach, SWIFT’s Chief Innovation Officer, 
 
“Making payments infrastructure based on CBDCs efficient and interoperable with the broader economy presents some new challenges, but the majority are the same as those faced by existing payment solutions.”4
 
The overarching difficulty, however, lies in adapting existing practices and payment mechanics to digital currency technologies, and vice versa. 
 
 
Who Is Testing these Models? Is there a Proof of Concept?
 
 
Project Helvetia at the Bank for International Settlements
 

The Bank for International Settlements’ (BIS) Innovation Hub has already launched a two-part proof of concept of the use of a wholesale central bank digital currency5 called, “Project Helvetia.”   The experiment was intended to investigate ̈experiment investigates how the provision of central bank money for wholesale settlement might be adapted if distributed ledger technology (DLT) and tokenization are adopted by financial markets." According to BIS: 

 
“Project Helvetia investigates how central bank money can be used for settlement in a world where securities and other financial assets migrate from today’s centralised financial market infrastructures to new so-called decentralised or tokenised platforms for trading and post-trading activities. One proof of concept relies on wholesale central bank digital currency (w-CBDC) whereas another is based on a link to the existing central bank system for wholesale payments.” 

 

  • Phase I built on the test environments of the Swiss real-time gross settlement system – SIX Interbank Clearing (SIC) system6 –  and SIX Digital Exchange (SDX), a platform for the trading and settlement of tokenized assets, assets that exist on a DLT platform, settled with a privately issued digital coin.
     

  • Phase II expanded on the work carried out in Phase I by (i) adding commercial banks to the experiment; and (ii) integrating wholesale central bank digital currency (wCBDC) into the core banking systems of the central bank and commercial banks. It demonstrated that a wholesale central bank digital currency (w-CBDC) can be integrated with existing core banking systems and processes of commercial and central banks. Furthermore, it showed that issuing a wCBDC on a DLT platform operated and owned by a private sector company is feasible under Swiss law.7

Source: https://www.bis.org/publ/othp45.pdf

 

Phase I of Project Helvetia, concluded in December 2020, demonstrated the functional feasibility and legal robustness of settling tokenized assets with a wholesale central bank digital currency and with linking a DLT platform to the existing central bank payment system. Phase II tested the integration of wholesale CBDC settlement with the core banking systems of five commercial banks. Among its findings, Phase II, completed in January 2022, concluded that cross-border transactions employing CBDCs could be made in a few seconds, instead of the three to five days necessary using the current system.8 

 

The speed was achieved by eliminating some of the frictions of the current system, including the mechanics of currency exchange, variations in different technological infrastructure, timezone complications, and coordination problems among intermediaries, including correspondent banks and nonbank financial service providers.

 

Project Jura at Bank of France and Swiss National Bank

 

Project Jura, a joint project of the BIS Innovation Hub, the Bank of France, the Swiss National Bank, and a private sector consortium9, continued the work of Helvetia and explored the settlement of tokenized euro commercial paper and foreign exchange transactions. Tests run and concluded in December 2021 were conducted in a sandboxed, near real-life setting. Jura studied a new approach for central banks to allow access to CBDC’s for Swiss-regulated non-resident financial institutions.10

 

According to BIS, Project Jura was intended to test as-yet unexplored aspects of cross-border CBDC mechanics: 

 

“Issuing wholesale CBDCs on a third-party platform and giving regulated non-resident financial institutions direct access to central bank money raises intricate policy issues. Jura explored a new approach including subnetworks and dual-notary signing, which may give central banks comfort to issue wholesale CBDCs on third-party platforms and to provide regulated non-resident financial institutions with access to wholesale CBDCs.”

 

Other Cross-border Studies


The BIS Innovation Hub is participating in two other trials exploring the use of a wholesale CBDC for cross-border payments, referred to as a multi-CBDC (mCBDC). One is mCBDC Bridge, a project between the central banks of Thailand, Hong Kong, China, and the UAE.  Another is Project Dunbar, in which the Monetary Authority of Singapore is trialing a single DLT solution where banks can use multiple CBDCs for cross-border payments.

 

Conclusion

The frontier of cross-border CBDC transactions lies before us. The results of various projects spearheaded by BIS, central banks, and national monetary authorities demonstrate that a faster, more efficient, and less costly cross-border payment system is possible. As Sopnendu Mohanty of the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) said,

“That’s where the beauty of a wholesale (CBDC) currency plus a DLT based shared ledger could make a big difference, . . . collectively bring[ing] down the 3% cost to a sub dollar cost for transfers and hence encourage financial inclusion.”

 


1 Bank for International Settlements, “Report To The G20: Central Bank Digital Currencies For Cross-Border Payments,” July 2021

2 World Bank Group, "Central Bank Digital Currencies for Cross-border Payments: A Review of Current Experiments and Ideas," Nov. 2021; Bank for International Settlements, “Report To The G20: Central Bank Digital Currencies For Cross-Border Payments,” July 2021,

3 SWIFT’s ISO 20022 is an emerging global open standard for payments messaging that could be adapted to accommodate the eventual widespread adoption of CBDC’s for cross-border payments. https://www.swift.com/standards/iso-20022

4 https://www.swift.com/news-events/news/exploring-central-bank-digital-currencies-swift-and-accenture-publish-joint-paper 

5 Wholesale CBDCs are for use by regulated financial institutions, in contrast to retail CBDCś that would be used by the public. https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2021e3.htm 

6 RealTime Gross Settlement (RTGS) is a system where there is the continuous and real-time settlement of fund-transfers, individually on a transaction by transaction basis (without netting). 'Real Time' means the processing of instructions at the time they are received. Because the funds settlement takes place in the books of a nation’s central bank, the payments are final and irrevocable. https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/payments/rtgs-chaps-brief-intro.pdf

7 https://www.bis.org/about/bisih/topics/cbdc/helvetia.htm 

8 https://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/project_helvetia_phase_II_report/source/project_helvetia_phase_II_report.en.pdf

9 Accenture, Credit Suisse, Natixis, R3, SIX Digital Exchange, and UBS

10 https://www.bis.org/press/p211208.htm 

 

Print

Corporate Outreach Milestones

MILESTONES FOR LENDER DIRECTED VOTING

May 8, 2014: Council of Institutional Investors; - CII Elects New Board, Names Jay Chaudhuri Board Chair. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-31/north-carolina-treasurer-may-cede-pension-control-5-questions.html )

February 2014:  Swiss Minder Initiative implies the value of LDV. http://www.ipe.com/switzerlands-minder-initiative-will-cripple-securities-lending-experts-warn/10000947.article.

January 2014FL SBA begins their SecLending Auction Program with eSecLending.

November 27, 2013 – CSFME staff call with Glass Lewis Chief Operating Officer. He gave his commitment for cooperation and support for LDV, and most importantly, he suggested that perhaps we should discuss with a Broadridge/State Street/Citi the scenario that permits Citi to forward an “Omnibus Ballot” of proxies to State Street, which State Street would then take and assign the proxies to their pension lenders/LDV participants, which would then be incorporated into a single ballot and sent to Broadridge. This eliminates the secondary ballot issue. While this description is oversimplified, Glass Lewis was fairly certain the parties involved could operationally create such a combined ballot. Responding to the question on cost, the Glass Lewis executive stated that the cost depends on the number of voting policies a fund has. Most funds have one policy; therefore, depending on the client, the cost would be $.75 – $2.00 per ballot.

October 21, 2013 – CSFME staff call with ISS Chief Operations Officer. He committed his cooperation and support to advance LDV’s implementation into the markets. He responded to the question about cost: “It depends on the client and the services they use. $6-7 per ballot on average.”

June 25-28, 2013 – CSFME staff attended ICGN Annual Conference in NY, NY. Spoke with executives of CalSTRS; ICGN Chair and Blackrock about LDV.  We received favorable comments and encouragement from each.

June 6, 2013: CSFME meets with Chief Investment Officer for NYC Pension Funds. While very much in favor of the LDV concept, the comments that the NYC Pension Fund Boards are for the most part followers in new initiatives and would prefer a roll-out by other funds first.

April 5, 2013: ‘SEC gives CSFME limited approval for LDV going forward’ providing brokers assign proxies only from their proprietary shares.

March 26, 2013 – CSFME and its legal team presented the case for LDV to SEC Commissioner Dan Gallagher. Present by phone and speaking on behalf of LDV were representatives of FL SBA who spoke about the difficulty of timely recall of shares on loan following release of record date and issues on agenda; and a representative from CalSTRS who spoke about their recall policy affecting income.

March 13, 2013 – CSFME meet staff of Senator Rob Portman and Congressman Steve Stivers of Ohio. These meetings were for the purpose of lining up political support, should the SEC resist the LDV concept. We also met and spoke with CII Deputy Director Amy Borrus for one hour and 15 minutes for a scheduled 30 minute meeting.  She expressed great interest in the value of LDV to long-term beneficial owners.

January 17, 2013 – CSFME conference call with CoPERA Director of Investments.  Among CoPERA’s concerns were: (1) How are agents/brokers notified re: LDV? (2) Who moves or approaches first lender to agent or agent to lender? CSFME responds  that a side letter is needed between lender, agent and broker.

November 8, 2012 – CSFME conference call with Council of Institutional Investors (CII) detailing LDV. Some in attendance were opposed to securities lending because of their desire to vote 100% of recall. This position would be irrelevant giving CalSTRS’ change to policy on proxy recall.

October 24, 2012, 2PM – CSFME presents LDV to Broadridge Institutional Investor Group. At this meeting, a representative of CalSTRS states: “We would view brokers willing to provide proxies more favorably than those who would not.” We were also informed by CalSTRS that they were looking to change their 100% recall policy. A representative of SWIB led a discussion on International Voting Issues, and apparently was chairing 3 meetings to determine the following: 1. who is voting internationally? 2. What are the issues in the international markets? 3. How do we increase and improve international processes?

October 24, 2012, 11AM – EWB/KT conference call with ICGN.  Executives stated that the argument for LDV may not be as strong in a non-record date market, and asked what would be the cost for LDV.  They further stated that they would like to see the U.S. go with LDV first and would need more information and operational detail.

October 13, 2012 email note from Elizabeth Danese Mozely to Broadridge’s Institutional Investor Working Group: “TerriJo Saarela, State of Wisconsin Investment Board, will provide commentary on their fund’s interest in international voting and an update on her participation in the Council of Institutional Investors’ working group on international voting.  Our discussion will include the differences in process for voting abroad, share blocking, attendance at the meeting via proxy or Power of Attorney (POA), best practices available through the various laws and regulations, etc.”

September 18, 2012: CSFME contacts Blackrock/ICGN Chair for a brief on LDV.

August 13, 2012 – CSFME conference call with OTPP.  Discussion of LDV was not timely in that their SecLending Program stopped lending securities through agents in mid-2006. State Street is their custodian and they were using a tri-party repo through Chase to Lehman, until the Lehman collapse. All the assets sat at Chase. It was not clear who had voting rights. At the time of this discussion in August 2012, OTPP was thinking formulating an SLA because they do not have the capacity to lend securities on their own. We have had no discussion with them since.

August 2, 2012 – CSFME contacts Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTPP) regarding LDV.

March 19, 2012 – CSFME conference call with executive in charge of securities lending for Franklin Templeton

February 22, 2012ICGN sends LDV letter of support to the SEC, signed by Chairman of the ICGN Board of Governors.

September 30, 2011CalSTRS sends LDV letter of support to the SEC, signed by Director of Corporate Governance Anne Sheehan.

July 18, 2011Florida SBA sends LDV letter of support to the SEC, signed by Executive Director and Chief Investment Officer.

November 2011 – CSFME introduces Council of Institutional Investors editor to LDV.

July 5, 2011 – CSFME sends a Comment Letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission regarding LDV.

October 2010 – CSFME releases report: Borrowed Proxy Abuse: Real or Not? This report and the SEC’s Securities Lending and Short Selling Roundtable prompted the question from beneficial owners and regulators regarding the need to recall shares on loan to vote proxies, why can’t lenders receive proxies for shares on loan when we get the dividends? From this question, the idea for Lender Directed Voting was born.

January 2010 – SEC issues rules that brokers no longer have the discretion to vote their customers’ shares held in companies without receiving voting instructions from those customers about how to vote them in an election of directors. http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/votingrules2010.htm. The rule, periodically, contributed to the difficulty of corporate meetings attaining a quorum.

Fall 2009/2010 – Four public pension funds join CSFME in Empty Voting studies/LDV initiative; FL SBA, CalSTRS, SWIB and CoPERA.

September 29-30, 2009 - SEC Announces Panelists for Securities Lending and Short Sale Roundtable; http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-207.htm