What is LDV ?

Who benefits from LDV?

LDV benefits all participants in the securities finance industry.  Lenders are better able to exercise their corporate governance responsibilities and, since lenders recall fewer loans, overall securities lending volume and revenue increase.  Loan, borrow, and collateral portfolios are more stable, allowing agents and brokers to more effectively manage investment, counterparty, and operational risks.  Corporate issuers receive more proxy votes from long-term investors, allowing them to reach quorum more quickly and at lower cost, and counterbalance votes of short-term activists.  Higher loan volumes also improve financial market liquidity and price discovery.

 

What is Lender-Directed Voting, or LDV?

LDV is a new process that matches securities lenders' loaned shares to broker securities that would otherwise go unvoted, enabling lenders to direct proxies without recalling loans.  It substantially improves existing market practices, which require lenders to recall loan in order to vote proxies.  Recalls are inefficient in that they reduce overall lending and borrowing revenue, and create instability in loan, borrow, and collateral portfolios. 

Why haven't lenders voted on loaned shares in the past?

Historically, institutional securities lenders had to forgo voting rights on loaned shares because there was no mechanism to vote without recalls.  Recent technology and transparency improvements in securities finance markets, however, enable loaned shares to be matched with broker shares that would otherwise go unvoted.  In particular, the Agent Lender Disclosure Initiative made apparent the direct counterparty relationship between lenders and broker-borrowers and provided brokers with detailed loan data necessary to include lenders in their proxy allocation routines.

Are there enough unvoted shares to cover lender voting interest?

Approximately 60 billion U.S. equities go unvoted each year[1], while roughly 15 billion shares are on loan[2], suggesting that sufficient votes could be available to meet lender vote demand.  However, it is unlikely that lender voting interest will be fully covered for all issues, such as those with particularly contentious proxy events or that are hard-to-borrow in securities lending markets. 


[1] www.broadridge.com/investor–communications /us/Broadridge_Proxy_Stats_2010.pdf
[2] Data from RMA securities lending composite, assuming $20 average stock price

Does the broker have the lender’s shares on the proxy record date?

1.  U.S. Federal Reserve Regulation T (“Reg T”) defines the permitted purposes for the extension of credit in the borrowing and lending of securities. In general, all of these purposes involve settling trades through re-delivery of the borrowed securities. Most often, the broker’s need to borrow has arisen after failing to receive securities required for an impending trade settlement, either as the result of an operational breakdown or after a short sale.

2.  Given the broker-borrower’s mandatory compliance with Reg T, it can be argued that borrowed shares, which are re-delivered in the settlement of a trade, are not available on the broker’s books (as a technical matter, the position would be held at DTCC) in order to earn voting rights on the proxy record date. However, this argument would only be true per se if the settlement took place on the proxy record date, because an analysis of the ongoing process reveals that the proxy votes, not just the entitled shares, are properly treated as fully fungible on the broker-borrower’s books.

3.  Reg T does not require that the borrowed shares be returned to the original lender when a subsequent receipt of securities is used to offset the original failure-to-receive. At that point, the borrower can certainly return the securities to the original lender. Yet, an active borrower can also compliantly decide to close a loan of the same securities with a different institutional lender whose terms may have become less attractive or from another broker-dealer lender who may be viewed as more likely to recall shares at an inconvenient time in the future, especially if the shares were borrowed for an ongoing short position. Still another reason may exist to hold the securities if the broker considers the return on its cash collateral, received through a rebate from the lender, to be very attractive compared with other investment options. In all those cases, as well as for actively traded issues where there may be a high risk of ongoing settlement failures, the broker can simply keep the newly-received shares in its inventory, balanced against its obligation to the lender.

4. As a result of efficient management of its settlement obligations, a broker – perhaps all brokers – may well have borrowed positions on their books on proxy record dates. The brokers would have gained the right to assign proxies or even to vote at the next corporate meeting as a direct result of the original loans from institutional lenders. In effect, the proxies are fungible on the brokers’ books, along with the borrowed shares themselves subject, of course, to an equitable assignment of proxy rights in compliance with stock exchange rules. Yet, brokers are not expressly permitted to assign proxies to their institutional lenders. At this point, the Lender Directed Voting (“LDV”) argument gains relevance and substance.

5. As noted, in addition to holding the shares cum voting rights, the broker also retains an obligation to its original lender. Indeed, one could argue that an institutional lender's ownership rights are stronger than those of other “beneficial owners” to whom the broker owes shares in the same securities. That is partly due to the distinction that can be drawn between the institutional lenders, who do not receive proxy assignments, and the broker’s own margin customers and hedge fund clients, who do receive proxy assignments. The distinction resides in the timeline of their property rights: the former owned the shares fully prior to lending them to the broker, while the latter required broker-financing in order to acquire their positions. Although we have seen that the institution’s shares may now be on the broker’s books, it is very likely that the financing customers’ shares are out on loan, i.e., hypothecated as collateral to source the broker’s own funding needs. And, in such cases, those positions are truly not in the brokers’ DTC account, although the brokers may well be assigning proxy rights to their accountholders. One can ably argue that those proxies would more equitably be assigned to the institutional lenders.

How can lenders instruct broker shares?

Brokers administer proxy allocation routines to distribute proxies to their customers.  Since broker shares are held in fungible bulk and lenders have beneficial ownership to loaned shares, brokers can include lenders in their allocation routines.  After brokers allocate proxies to lenders, standard proxy processes are followed to garner and submit voting instructions and submit them to corporate issuers.  For example, proxies are assigned to Broadridge accounts designated for the lenders, then are instructed by lenders or ISS on the lenders' behalf.

Could lenders also instruct custodians' unvoted shares?

Regulatory and operational considerations may pose challenges to matching custodians' unvoted shares with lenders’ loan positions.  In particular, custodian shares are not held in fungible bulk, as are broker shares, which presents difficulties when considering custodial allocation of proxies across lender accounts. Furthermore, custodians are not counterparties on loans, so the lenders are not beneficial owners to any of the custodians’ unvoted shares.

Does LDV contribute to “over-reporting,” since lenders’ shares were delivered to new buyers who now have the associated voting rights?

Existing proxy reconciliation processes are sufficient to address any potential "over-reporting" issues.  For example, brokers already use post-reconciliation processes to mitigate the risk of over-reporting that may arise from assigning proxies to margin customers whose shares may have been loaned or rehypothecated.

How do brokers decide which lender(s) are assigned proxies?

Beneficial owners and regulators have expressed concerns about voting opportunities being directed to preferred lenders or leveraged for beneficial loan terms.  In the same way that agent lending queues are designed so that lenders get equitable access to borrower demand, brokers need pre-defined and algorithmic “proxy queues” to ensure equitable assignment of voting opportunities.  Furthermore, on-going auditing and validation of proxy assignments may be needed to ensure against development of a “market for votes.” 

What if proxies are not available from a lender's borrower, but are from another broker?

Reallocation of the loans to brokers with available proxies would increase overall lender voting opportunities.  However, numerous other loan factors would need to be taken into account, such as counterparty risk assessments and credit limits, loan prices, and collateral types and quantity.  Considering these factors, loan reallocations may not be in the overall best interest of lenders and borrowers, and will have to be considered on a case-by-case basis.

How can lenders know, before record date, how many proxies they will be assigned?

To the extent that lenders receive proxies through LDV, they will not have to recall loans to regain voting rights.  However, broker holdings change daily and varying numbers of investors vote, so the number of proxies that can be assigned to lenders cannot be known with certainty until just before the meeting date, which is typically two months after lenders must make record date recall decisions.   The number of available proxies must therefore be forecasted, taking into account factors such as each broker's customer base, the scarcity of shares in the securities lending market, and the expected materiality of proxy ballot items.

Corporate Governance Blog

Monday, April 18, 2022

SEC Gets an “Earful” on Securities Lending and Short-selling Disclosure Proposals

And Another Thing - Longer Comment Periods, Please


Author: David Schwartz J.D. CPA

The Securities and Exchange Commission's controversial securities lending disclosure proposal (Proposal) sought public input on 97 questions and received a substantial body of feedback during the initial 30-day comment period. Drawing sharp rebukes, most responses from trade associations for lenders and borrowers focused on the ambiguous scope of rule 10c-1, the feasibility of the proposed 15-minute reporting regime, lopsided cost and technology burdens, and the risks of reverse engineering posed by the public disclosure provisions. Acquiescing after a month of consideration to the desires of a host of commenters for more time to respond, the Commission extended the Proposal's comment period from January 7, 2022, to April 1, 2022.[1] The securities lending industry took advantage of the extra time to amplify prior criticisms and raise new issues with the Proposal, giving the SEC yet another earful. Advanced Securities Consulting and CSFME used the additional comment time to expand upon a comprehensive alternative to remedy the Proposal's weaknesses. 

 

Scope and Clarity

Commenters from across the industry said that the Proposal fails to provide securities lending market participants with clarity regarding the specific types of transactions subject to the rule 10c-1 disclosure regime. They also pointed out substantial uncertainty about the territorial scope of the 10c-1 reporting obligation. Commenters used the extended comment period to offer specific suggestions for narrowing the scope of the disclosure requirements. Citadel and the Alternative Investment Management Association (AIMA) pointed out that the rule 10c-1 proposal is overly-broad and sweeps into its ambit securities transactions made to fulfill delivery obligations arising from customer short-sales (referred to as "retail" securities lending in the release). Complicating matters further, the SEC's separate rule 13f-2, "Short Position and Short Activity Reporting Proposal," issued in February 2022, proposes to cover similar "retail" transactions. State Street requested that the Commission exclude GC securities from the final rule due to the fungibility of GC securities, saying, "[i]n our experience, the details of loan activity involving GC securities are unlikely to be of informational value to the market." 

 

Disclosure Contradictions

According to some commenters, the SEC's philosophy for short-selling disclosure seemingly contradicts its philosophy for securities lending disclosure. Citadel pointed out that the Commission's calculus for each of their respective proposed disclosure regimes is illogically inconsistent: 

 

"Importantly, ignoring all of these significant costs in favor of a transaction-by-transaction short sale public reporting regime contradicts the Commission's own reasoning in its recent rule proposal regarding 'Short Position and Short Activity Reporting by Institutional Investment Managers' (the 'Short Position Reporting Proposal'), which was issued after this Proposal and in which the Commission concluded that aggregate and delayed disclosure of short sale positions was preferable to transaction-by-transaction and intraday disclosure."

 

AIMA further hammered this point home by contrasting the Commission's "thoughtful" examination in the 'Short Position Reporting Proposal' of "the negative market impacts that can materialize from too much granular disclosure" against the Commission's failure to assess the similar effects in the context of securities lending. 

 

The Managed Fund Association took the Commission to task for the inconsistent reasoning in the two proposals as well.

 

"Even more troubling is that the economic analysis of the proposed loan disclosure rule purports to treat the public disclosure of loan by loan information as an unmitigated benefit to the short selling market, even though the Commission concluded the opposite in the proposed Short Position Disclosure Rule."

 

Deficient/Flawed Cost-Benefit Analysis 

Many comment letters, including our own, criticized the sufficiency and rigor of the Proposal's cost-benefit analysis. In the second round of letters, Citadel and former SEC Chief Economist James A. Overdahl, Ph.D., offered scathing critiques of the SEC's statutorily required cost-benefit analysis. Citadel went as far as pointing out that the Commission admits that the Proposal's analysis is deficient and that the SEC has merely waved away as impossible the real work of assessing the economic consequences of the Proposal. 

 

"By not quantifying the asserted deficiencies in existing data or any improvements that would be fostered by the proposed rule, the Commission has neglected its statutory duty to assess the economic consequences of the Proposal. The Commission admits that it has access to at least some securities lending data, but says that 'it is not practicable . . . to quantify certain economic effects' of the Proposal given the 'number and type of assumptions' that would be necessary. This is a notable shortcoming; the Commission admits that it did not make the type of 'tough choices about . . . competing estimates' that they Exchange Act requires the Commission to make, nor did it 'hazard a guess as to which is correct."

 

Former SEC Chief Economist and Director of the Office of Economic Analysis, James A. Overdahl, challenged the Proposal's foundational cost-benefit assumptions. Dr. Overdahl takes issue with the Commission's assumption that mandating disclosure in this context would positively affect the securities lending and short-selling markets. On the contrary, Dr. Overdahl says, "The effect of such rules on market quality is negative rather than positive, as traders adjust their behavior to avoid the adverse effects of disclosing their strategies." 

 

Dr. Overdahl also challenged the basis for the Commission's claims that the proposed rules would lower costs, stating that the Commission's reliance on TRACE studies as a model was inappropriate because secondary "bond market transactions are irrevocable and fungible." In contrast, securities lending transactions "are revocable and unique and more akin to primary market borrowing transactions." Consequently, any cost reduction predicted in the Proposal based on TRACE is simply inapplicable. Dr. Overdahl also points out recent empirical evidence that "is directly relevant to the proposed rule, and highlights some of the adverse effects that the proposed rule should be expected to have on the functioning of the stock lending market and on price discovery." 

 

Regulatory Arbitrage 

Dr. Overdahl says the Commission has failed to factor into the Proposal the potential consequences of regulatory arbitrage in the securities lending and short selling markets. Because of the lack of clarity around the Proposal's extra-territorial effect, other commenters may have overlooked this point as well. 

 

"The Commission's economic analysis contained in the Proposing Release treats the securities lending market in the United States as if it sits in isolation from the rest of the world. The analysis fails to account for the consequences associated with the fact that the securities lending market operates across several jurisdictions around the globe. A report from the International Organization of Securities Commissions ("IOSCO") describes the global growth of securities lending activity over many years and concludes that this growth has resulted in increased market competition and lower lending rates. In other words, the securities lending market in the United States does not sit in isolation from the rest of the world. The fact that the securities lending market operates across different jurisdictions is significant in understanding the economic impact of the proposed rule because it requires that the potential impact of regulatory arbitrage be considered. However, the potential consequences of regulatory arbitrage across jurisdictions are not addressed in the Proposing Release."

 

Cost Burden

State Street picked up on our earlier comments about lenders bearing the entire cost of compliance. It urged the Commission "to clarify in the final rule that the costs incurred by the RNSA to establish and operate the reporting system for securities lending transaction and related information should be equitably shared by borrowers and lenders, even if the actual reporting obligation remains single-sided."  

 

Longer Comment Periods, Please

The sheer volume of rule proposals issued by the SEC over the past year and a half, coupled with "serially short" comment periods, prompted a dozen securities industry groups to band together in a joint letter to petition the Commission to allow for sufficient time to respond meaningfully. The letter's authors cite the "roughly 3,570 pages and "roughly 2,260 individually identified questions" in fifteen open rule proposals issued in rapid succession. 

 

"Overlapping and serially short comment periods," the authors say, simply do not give the public "sufficient time for meaningful public input into individual proposals and more holistically on the Commission's rulemaking agenda and the possible interconnectedness of these proposals is vitally important and ultimately could have a significant impact on savers, investors, capital formation, and economic growth and job creation."

 

The joint letter urges the Commission to be mindful of the complexity of their rule proposals and their statutory responsibilities to solicit and consider public feedback and to tailor the lengths of comment periods accordingly. 

 

 

 

[1] In extending the rule 10c-1 proposal's comment period, the Commission also invited public comments on whether there would be any "effects of proposed Rule 13f-2 that the Commission should consider in connection with proposed Rule 10c-1."

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Corporate Outreach Milestones

MILESTONES FOR LENDER DIRECTED VOTING

May 8, 2014: Council of Institutional Investors; - CII Elects New Board, Names Jay Chaudhuri Board Chair. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-31/north-carolina-treasurer-may-cede-pension-control-5-questions.html )

February 2014:  Swiss Minder Initiative implies the value of LDV. http://www.ipe.com/switzerlands-minder-initiative-will-cripple-securities-lending-experts-warn/10000947.article.

January 2014FL SBA begins their SecLending Auction Program with eSecLending.

November 27, 2013 – CSFME staff call with Glass Lewis Chief Operating Officer. He gave his commitment for cooperation and support for LDV, and most importantly, he suggested that perhaps we should discuss with a Broadridge/State Street/Citi the scenario that permits Citi to forward an “Omnibus Ballot” of proxies to State Street, which State Street would then take and assign the proxies to their pension lenders/LDV participants, which would then be incorporated into a single ballot and sent to Broadridge. This eliminates the secondary ballot issue. While this description is oversimplified, Glass Lewis was fairly certain the parties involved could operationally create such a combined ballot. Responding to the question on cost, the Glass Lewis executive stated that the cost depends on the number of voting policies a fund has. Most funds have one policy; therefore, depending on the client, the cost would be $.75 – $2.00 per ballot.

October 21, 2013 – CSFME staff call with ISS Chief Operations Officer. He committed his cooperation and support to advance LDV’s implementation into the markets. He responded to the question about cost: “It depends on the client and the services they use. $6-7 per ballot on average.”

June 25-28, 2013 – CSFME staff attended ICGN Annual Conference in NY, NY. Spoke with executives of CalSTRS; ICGN Chair and Blackrock about LDV.  We received favorable comments and encouragement from each.

June 6, 2013: CSFME meets with Chief Investment Officer for NYC Pension Funds. While very much in favor of the LDV concept, the comments that the NYC Pension Fund Boards are for the most part followers in new initiatives and would prefer a roll-out by other funds first.

April 5, 2013: ‘SEC gives CSFME limited approval for LDV going forward’ providing brokers assign proxies only from their proprietary shares.

March 26, 2013 – CSFME and its legal team presented the case for LDV to SEC Commissioner Dan Gallagher. Present by phone and speaking on behalf of LDV were representatives of FL SBA who spoke about the difficulty of timely recall of shares on loan following release of record date and issues on agenda; and a representative from CalSTRS who spoke about their recall policy affecting income.

March 13, 2013 – CSFME meet staff of Senator Rob Portman and Congressman Steve Stivers of Ohio. These meetings were for the purpose of lining up political support, should the SEC resist the LDV concept. We also met and spoke with CII Deputy Director Amy Borrus for one hour and 15 minutes for a scheduled 30 minute meeting.  She expressed great interest in the value of LDV to long-term beneficial owners.

January 17, 2013 – CSFME conference call with CoPERA Director of Investments.  Among CoPERA’s concerns were: (1) How are agents/brokers notified re: LDV? (2) Who moves or approaches first lender to agent or agent to lender? CSFME responds  that a side letter is needed between lender, agent and broker.

November 8, 2012 – CSFME conference call with Council of Institutional Investors (CII) detailing LDV. Some in attendance were opposed to securities lending because of their desire to vote 100% of recall. This position would be irrelevant giving CalSTRS’ change to policy on proxy recall.

October 24, 2012, 2PM – CSFME presents LDV to Broadridge Institutional Investor Group. At this meeting, a representative of CalSTRS states: “We would view brokers willing to provide proxies more favorably than those who would not.” We were also informed by CalSTRS that they were looking to change their 100% recall policy. A representative of SWIB led a discussion on International Voting Issues, and apparently was chairing 3 meetings to determine the following: 1. who is voting internationally? 2. What are the issues in the international markets? 3. How do we increase and improve international processes?

October 24, 2012, 11AM – EWB/KT conference call with ICGN.  Executives stated that the argument for LDV may not be as strong in a non-record date market, and asked what would be the cost for LDV.  They further stated that they would like to see the U.S. go with LDV first and would need more information and operational detail.

October 13, 2012 email note from Elizabeth Danese Mozely to Broadridge’s Institutional Investor Working Group: “TerriJo Saarela, State of Wisconsin Investment Board, will provide commentary on their fund’s interest in international voting and an update on her participation in the Council of Institutional Investors’ working group on international voting.  Our discussion will include the differences in process for voting abroad, share blocking, attendance at the meeting via proxy or Power of Attorney (POA), best practices available through the various laws and regulations, etc.”

September 18, 2012: CSFME contacts Blackrock/ICGN Chair for a brief on LDV.

August 13, 2012 – CSFME conference call with OTPP.  Discussion of LDV was not timely in that their SecLending Program stopped lending securities through agents in mid-2006. State Street is their custodian and they were using a tri-party repo through Chase to Lehman, until the Lehman collapse. All the assets sat at Chase. It was not clear who had voting rights. At the time of this discussion in August 2012, OTPP was thinking formulating an SLA because they do not have the capacity to lend securities on their own. We have had no discussion with them since.

August 2, 2012 – CSFME contacts Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTPP) regarding LDV.

March 19, 2012 – CSFME conference call with executive in charge of securities lending for Franklin Templeton

February 22, 2012ICGN sends LDV letter of support to the SEC, signed by Chairman of the ICGN Board of Governors.

September 30, 2011CalSTRS sends LDV letter of support to the SEC, signed by Director of Corporate Governance Anne Sheehan.

July 18, 2011Florida SBA sends LDV letter of support to the SEC, signed by Executive Director and Chief Investment Officer.

November 2011 – CSFME introduces Council of Institutional Investors editor to LDV.

July 5, 2011 – CSFME sends a Comment Letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission regarding LDV.

October 2010 – CSFME releases report: Borrowed Proxy Abuse: Real or Not? This report and the SEC’s Securities Lending and Short Selling Roundtable prompted the question from beneficial owners and regulators regarding the need to recall shares on loan to vote proxies, why can’t lenders receive proxies for shares on loan when we get the dividends? From this question, the idea for Lender Directed Voting was born.

January 2010 – SEC issues rules that brokers no longer have the discretion to vote their customers’ shares held in companies without receiving voting instructions from those customers about how to vote them in an election of directors. http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/votingrules2010.htm. The rule, periodically, contributed to the difficulty of corporate meetings attaining a quorum.

Fall 2009/2010 – Four public pension funds join CSFME in Empty Voting studies/LDV initiative; FL SBA, CalSTRS, SWIB and CoPERA.

September 29-30, 2009 - SEC Announces Panelists for Securities Lending and Short Sale Roundtable; http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-207.htm