What is LDV ?

Who benefits from LDV?

LDV benefits all participants in the securities finance industry.  Lenders are better able to exercise their corporate governance responsibilities and, since lenders recall fewer loans, overall securities lending volume and revenue increase.  Loan, borrow, and collateral portfolios are more stable, allowing agents and brokers to more effectively manage investment, counterparty, and operational risks.  Corporate issuers receive more proxy votes from long-term investors, allowing them to reach quorum more quickly and at lower cost, and counterbalance votes of short-term activists.  Higher loan volumes also improve financial market liquidity and price discovery.

 

What is Lender-Directed Voting, or LDV?

LDV is a new process that matches securities lenders' loaned shares to broker securities that would otherwise go unvoted, enabling lenders to direct proxies without recalling loans.  It substantially improves existing market practices, which require lenders to recall loan in order to vote proxies.  Recalls are inefficient in that they reduce overall lending and borrowing revenue, and create instability in loan, borrow, and collateral portfolios. 

Why haven't lenders voted on loaned shares in the past?

Historically, institutional securities lenders had to forgo voting rights on loaned shares because there was no mechanism to vote without recalls.  Recent technology and transparency improvements in securities finance markets, however, enable loaned shares to be matched with broker shares that would otherwise go unvoted.  In particular, the Agent Lender Disclosure Initiative made apparent the direct counterparty relationship between lenders and broker-borrowers and provided brokers with detailed loan data necessary to include lenders in their proxy allocation routines.

Are there enough unvoted shares to cover lender voting interest?

Approximately 60 billion U.S. equities go unvoted each year[1], while roughly 15 billion shares are on loan[2], suggesting that sufficient votes could be available to meet lender vote demand.  However, it is unlikely that lender voting interest will be fully covered for all issues, such as those with particularly contentious proxy events or that are hard-to-borrow in securities lending markets. 


[1] www.broadridge.com/investor–communications /us/Broadridge_Proxy_Stats_2010.pdf
[2] Data from RMA securities lending composite, assuming $20 average stock price

Does the broker have the lender’s shares on the proxy record date?

1.  U.S. Federal Reserve Regulation T (“Reg T”) defines the permitted purposes for the extension of credit in the borrowing and lending of securities. In general, all of these purposes involve settling trades through re-delivery of the borrowed securities. Most often, the broker’s need to borrow has arisen after failing to receive securities required for an impending trade settlement, either as the result of an operational breakdown or after a short sale.

2.  Given the broker-borrower’s mandatory compliance with Reg T, it can be argued that borrowed shares, which are re-delivered in the settlement of a trade, are not available on the broker’s books (as a technical matter, the position would be held at DTCC) in order to earn voting rights on the proxy record date. However, this argument would only be true per se if the settlement took place on the proxy record date, because an analysis of the ongoing process reveals that the proxy votes, not just the entitled shares, are properly treated as fully fungible on the broker-borrower’s books.

3.  Reg T does not require that the borrowed shares be returned to the original lender when a subsequent receipt of securities is used to offset the original failure-to-receive. At that point, the borrower can certainly return the securities to the original lender. Yet, an active borrower can also compliantly decide to close a loan of the same securities with a different institutional lender whose terms may have become less attractive or from another broker-dealer lender who may be viewed as more likely to recall shares at an inconvenient time in the future, especially if the shares were borrowed for an ongoing short position. Still another reason may exist to hold the securities if the broker considers the return on its cash collateral, received through a rebate from the lender, to be very attractive compared with other investment options. In all those cases, as well as for actively traded issues where there may be a high risk of ongoing settlement failures, the broker can simply keep the newly-received shares in its inventory, balanced against its obligation to the lender.

4. As a result of efficient management of its settlement obligations, a broker – perhaps all brokers – may well have borrowed positions on their books on proxy record dates. The brokers would have gained the right to assign proxies or even to vote at the next corporate meeting as a direct result of the original loans from institutional lenders. In effect, the proxies are fungible on the brokers’ books, along with the borrowed shares themselves subject, of course, to an equitable assignment of proxy rights in compliance with stock exchange rules. Yet, brokers are not expressly permitted to assign proxies to their institutional lenders. At this point, the Lender Directed Voting (“LDV”) argument gains relevance and substance.

5. As noted, in addition to holding the shares cum voting rights, the broker also retains an obligation to its original lender. Indeed, one could argue that an institutional lender's ownership rights are stronger than those of other “beneficial owners” to whom the broker owes shares in the same securities. That is partly due to the distinction that can be drawn between the institutional lenders, who do not receive proxy assignments, and the broker’s own margin customers and hedge fund clients, who do receive proxy assignments. The distinction resides in the timeline of their property rights: the former owned the shares fully prior to lending them to the broker, while the latter required broker-financing in order to acquire their positions. Although we have seen that the institution’s shares may now be on the broker’s books, it is very likely that the financing customers’ shares are out on loan, i.e., hypothecated as collateral to source the broker’s own funding needs. And, in such cases, those positions are truly not in the brokers’ DTC account, although the brokers may well be assigning proxy rights to their accountholders. One can ably argue that those proxies would more equitably be assigned to the institutional lenders.

How can lenders instruct broker shares?

Brokers administer proxy allocation routines to distribute proxies to their customers.  Since broker shares are held in fungible bulk and lenders have beneficial ownership to loaned shares, brokers can include lenders in their allocation routines.  After brokers allocate proxies to lenders, standard proxy processes are followed to garner and submit voting instructions and submit them to corporate issuers.  For example, proxies are assigned to Broadridge accounts designated for the lenders, then are instructed by lenders or ISS on the lenders' behalf.

Could lenders also instruct custodians' unvoted shares?

Regulatory and operational considerations may pose challenges to matching custodians' unvoted shares with lenders’ loan positions.  In particular, custodian shares are not held in fungible bulk, as are broker shares, which presents difficulties when considering custodial allocation of proxies across lender accounts. Furthermore, custodians are not counterparties on loans, so the lenders are not beneficial owners to any of the custodians’ unvoted shares.

Does LDV contribute to “over-reporting,” since lenders’ shares were delivered to new buyers who now have the associated voting rights?

Existing proxy reconciliation processes are sufficient to address any potential "over-reporting" issues.  For example, brokers already use post-reconciliation processes to mitigate the risk of over-reporting that may arise from assigning proxies to margin customers whose shares may have been loaned or rehypothecated.

How do brokers decide which lender(s) are assigned proxies?

Beneficial owners and regulators have expressed concerns about voting opportunities being directed to preferred lenders or leveraged for beneficial loan terms.  In the same way that agent lending queues are designed so that lenders get equitable access to borrower demand, brokers need pre-defined and algorithmic “proxy queues” to ensure equitable assignment of voting opportunities.  Furthermore, on-going auditing and validation of proxy assignments may be needed to ensure against development of a “market for votes.” 

What if proxies are not available from a lender's borrower, but are from another broker?

Reallocation of the loans to brokers with available proxies would increase overall lender voting opportunities.  However, numerous other loan factors would need to be taken into account, such as counterparty risk assessments and credit limits, loan prices, and collateral types and quantity.  Considering these factors, loan reallocations may not be in the overall best interest of lenders and borrowers, and will have to be considered on a case-by-case basis.

How can lenders know, before record date, how many proxies they will be assigned?

To the extent that lenders receive proxies through LDV, they will not have to recall loans to regain voting rights.  However, broker holdings change daily and varying numbers of investors vote, so the number of proxies that can be assigned to lenders cannot be known with certainty until just before the meeting date, which is typically two months after lenders must make record date recall decisions.   The number of available proxies must therefore be forecasted, taking into account factors such as each broker's customer base, the scarcity of shares in the securities lending market, and the expected materiality of proxy ballot items.

Corporate Governance Blog

Friday, September 30, 2022

Serious Doubts About the SEC's Short Sale Proposals

Disclosures Could be a Real Challenge for Managers and Brokers


Author: David Schwartz J.D. CPA

In February of 2022, the Securities and Exchange Commission proposed new disclosures to provide more transparency into institutional investors' short-selling activity. According to Chairman Gensler, collecting more granular data from large short sellers "would help us to better oversee the markets and understand the role short selling may play in market events." Despite these lofty goals, industry commenters are raising serious questions about whether some elements of the proposed new disclosure regime are structurally and technologically feasible.

 

The Proposals

Proposed rule 13f-2 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Form SHO would require institutional investment managers[1] to file monthly reports to the SEC providing extensive information on specific "large" short positions and short sale transactions.[2] The SEC intends to use these reports to disclose publicly aggregate data about short positions and short sale activity in individual securities.

 

If adopted, new Rule 205 of Regulation SHO would require broker-dealers to mark purchase orders as "buy to cover" if a buyer has any short position in the same security when the purchase order is entered. The new rule would also require reporting to the consolidated audit trail (CAT) of:

  1. "buy to cover" order marking information, and 

  2. situations where reporting firms complete short sales in reliance on the "bona-fide market maker exception" to the Regulation SHO "locate" requirement.

 

The Objections

a. Cost-Benefit  Commenters raised serious objections to the significant reporting and monitoring burdens the proposals would impose on institutional investment managers. Implementing the Proposed Form SHO reporting infrastructure (as well as the monitoring of its accurate functioning), they urged, will "incur significant costs on investment managers and, ultimately end-investors."

 

Commenters also noted that "Form SHO data collection framework is not justified from a cost benefit perspective, given that it provides only very limited additional relevant insight compared to currently available data." FINRA already collects data on short sale activity and recently requested comment on "potential enhancements to its short sale reporting program" through Regulatory Notice 21-19 published on June 4, 2021. Instead of the entirely new process contemplated in rule 13f-2, commenters said the focus should "lie on making enhancements to FINRA's existing collection and dissemination of aggregate short interest data and making the existing CAT data collection related to short activity fit for purpose." [4]

 

b. Scope The scope of data collection under rule 13f-2 is too broad, according to some in the industry. Valerie Dahiya at Perkins Coie suggested that "the SEC should consider an exemption for certain types of managers that do not regularly utilize short positions or that only utilize short positions for passive investing purposes, or at a minimum impose a longer filing period for initial filing requirements."

 

Ms. Dahiya also indicated that the final rule should only include net short positions. 

 

"The Proposal's "emphasis on gross short positions may overstate the effect (sic) to the market of the number of short positions outstanding. Rule 13f-2 should instead focus on net short positions." 

 

Finally, Ms. Dahiya said the rule 13f-2 thresholds were too low and suggested that in formulating the final rule: 

  1. The SEC should consider changing the dollar amount threshold under Threshold A of proposed Rule 13f-2 to $10 million net short position from gross, or include an exemption for hedged short positions. 

  2. The SEC should consider raising the percentage threshold under Threshold A of proposed Rule 13f-2 from 2.5% to 5%. 

 

c. Public Disclosure. Commenters objected to the publication of data under the proposal. Even in an aggregated state, public disclosure of the kind proposed by the Commission, according to commenters, "could allow for the reverse engineering of proprietary trading strategies." 

 

Disclosure of the kind contemplated by the proposal is potentially harmful to markets, generally. 

 

"Even if it is not possible to reverse engineer the trading strategy of a specific institutional investment manager, much of the contemplated data would be the result of proprietary trading strategies developed by institutional investment managers. Using this data, traders could still reconstruct these proprietary trading strategies and, in turn, create disincentives for institutional investment managers when considering trading strategies that involve short positions. This would ultimately be a detriment to market efficiency because, as noted by the Commission, short selling can be beneficial for the provision of information to markets." [5]

 

d. Affect on Securities Lending. The increased burden on market participants and additional costs associated with compliance with the proposed short sale reporting regime could have knock-on effects in the securities lending industry as well. 

 

"Adoption of Rule 13f-2 as drafted could have a negative impact on the securities lending market, as short selling relies on the ability to borrow securities that are available for loan. As further noted by the SEC, the Proposal would increase the cost of short selling, particularly large short positions, which could potentially lead to less overall short selling.13 When investors borrow shares, they pay a borrowing fee to the owner of the share. These fees can represent a significant source of revenue for pension funds, mutual funds, and other market participants on the buy-side. Therefore, to the extent that the Proposal discourages short selling, it may also lower overall portfolio returns, not just for the clients of institutional investment managers, but also for institutional investors that rely on securities lending as a source of passive return." [6]

 

e. Feasibility of "Buy to Cover" The feasibility of the proposed "buy to cover" order marking requirement was a major issue raised by many commenters. Imposing the new order marking requirement would impose significant costs as well as technological and practical challenges. According to the Financial Information Forum, "every institution would need to develop and maintain processes to validate in real-time for every buy order whether the buy order is a buy to cover order. There also would be a significant cost for broker-dealers to accept and process this order marker."

 

Even the proposal's attempt to "minimize costs to broker-dealers" is problematic to the industry:

 

"The Rule Proposal proposes a new methodology for determining positions in an attempt to "minimize costs to broker-dealers," but this new methodology will actually significantly increase the costs because it will require market participants to create two separate positions in real-time, one for sell order marking and an entirely different set of positions for buy order marking." [8]

 

Financial data and technology companies, like S-3 Partners, raised concerns about whether current information systems employed by investment managers would be able to handle the kinds of reporting demanded by the Proposal, noting that, "certain provisions of the Proposed Rule, including the activity monitoring required by Information Table 2, will be a substantial lift on the part of the investment managers’ internal systems."

 

Conclusion

Given the strong pushback from investment managers and others, the SEC will have to seriously consider the final rule's cost, structure, and practical effect. 

 


 

[1] Institutional Investment Managers as defined under Section 13(f)(6)(A) of the Exchange Act.

 

[2] The proposal would apply to certain institutional investment managers who hold, in an equity security of a reporting issuer, a short position of at least $10 million or the equivalent of 2.5 percent or more of the total shares outstanding, or who hold, in an equity security of a non-reporting issuer, a short position of at least $500,000.

 

[3] Notably, the proposal seeks comment on a potential alternative disclosure approach where, rather than aggregating managers' data together, each investment manager's Form SHO filings would be made publicly available (but masking the manager's name and other identifying information).

 

[4] Thomas Deinet, Executive Director, Standards Board for Alternative Investments Limited, London, April 26, 2022

 

[5] Valerie Dahiya, Partner, PerkinsCoie, Washington, D.C., April 26, 2022

 

[6] Id. at p. 5. 

 

[7] Proposing Release, p. 14968.

 

[8] Howard Meyerson, Managing Director, Financial Information Forum, April 25, 2022, p. 2

Print

Corporate Outreach Milestones

MILESTONES FOR LENDER DIRECTED VOTING

May 8, 2014: Council of Institutional Investors; - CII Elects New Board, Names Jay Chaudhuri Board Chair. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-31/north-carolina-treasurer-may-cede-pension-control-5-questions.html )

February 2014:  Swiss Minder Initiative implies the value of LDV. http://www.ipe.com/switzerlands-minder-initiative-will-cripple-securities-lending-experts-warn/10000947.article.

January 2014FL SBA begins their SecLending Auction Program with eSecLending.

November 27, 2013 – CSFME staff call with Glass Lewis Chief Operating Officer. He gave his commitment for cooperation and support for LDV, and most importantly, he suggested that perhaps we should discuss with a Broadridge/State Street/Citi the scenario that permits Citi to forward an “Omnibus Ballot” of proxies to State Street, which State Street would then take and assign the proxies to their pension lenders/LDV participants, which would then be incorporated into a single ballot and sent to Broadridge. This eliminates the secondary ballot issue. While this description is oversimplified, Glass Lewis was fairly certain the parties involved could operationally create such a combined ballot. Responding to the question on cost, the Glass Lewis executive stated that the cost depends on the number of voting policies a fund has. Most funds have one policy; therefore, depending on the client, the cost would be $.75 – $2.00 per ballot.

October 21, 2013 – CSFME staff call with ISS Chief Operations Officer. He committed his cooperation and support to advance LDV’s implementation into the markets. He responded to the question about cost: “It depends on the client and the services they use. $6-7 per ballot on average.”

June 25-28, 2013 – CSFME staff attended ICGN Annual Conference in NY, NY. Spoke with executives of CalSTRS; ICGN Chair and Blackrock about LDV.  We received favorable comments and encouragement from each.

June 6, 2013: CSFME meets with Chief Investment Officer for NYC Pension Funds. While very much in favor of the LDV concept, the comments that the NYC Pension Fund Boards are for the most part followers in new initiatives and would prefer a roll-out by other funds first.

April 5, 2013: ‘SEC gives CSFME limited approval for LDV going forward’ providing brokers assign proxies only from their proprietary shares.

March 26, 2013 – CSFME and its legal team presented the case for LDV to SEC Commissioner Dan Gallagher. Present by phone and speaking on behalf of LDV were representatives of FL SBA who spoke about the difficulty of timely recall of shares on loan following release of record date and issues on agenda; and a representative from CalSTRS who spoke about their recall policy affecting income.

March 13, 2013 – CSFME meet staff of Senator Rob Portman and Congressman Steve Stivers of Ohio. These meetings were for the purpose of lining up political support, should the SEC resist the LDV concept. We also met and spoke with CII Deputy Director Amy Borrus for one hour and 15 minutes for a scheduled 30 minute meeting.  She expressed great interest in the value of LDV to long-term beneficial owners.

January 17, 2013 – CSFME conference call with CoPERA Director of Investments.  Among CoPERA’s concerns were: (1) How are agents/brokers notified re: LDV? (2) Who moves or approaches first lender to agent or agent to lender? CSFME responds  that a side letter is needed between lender, agent and broker.

November 8, 2012 – CSFME conference call with Council of Institutional Investors (CII) detailing LDV. Some in attendance were opposed to securities lending because of their desire to vote 100% of recall. This position would be irrelevant giving CalSTRS’ change to policy on proxy recall.

October 24, 2012, 2PM – CSFME presents LDV to Broadridge Institutional Investor Group. At this meeting, a representative of CalSTRS states: “We would view brokers willing to provide proxies more favorably than those who would not.” We were also informed by CalSTRS that they were looking to change their 100% recall policy. A representative of SWIB led a discussion on International Voting Issues, and apparently was chairing 3 meetings to determine the following: 1. who is voting internationally? 2. What are the issues in the international markets? 3. How do we increase and improve international processes?

October 24, 2012, 11AM – EWB/KT conference call with ICGN.  Executives stated that the argument for LDV may not be as strong in a non-record date market, and asked what would be the cost for LDV.  They further stated that they would like to see the U.S. go with LDV first and would need more information and operational detail.

October 13, 2012 email note from Elizabeth Danese Mozely to Broadridge’s Institutional Investor Working Group: “TerriJo Saarela, State of Wisconsin Investment Board, will provide commentary on their fund’s interest in international voting and an update on her participation in the Council of Institutional Investors’ working group on international voting.  Our discussion will include the differences in process for voting abroad, share blocking, attendance at the meeting via proxy or Power of Attorney (POA), best practices available through the various laws and regulations, etc.”

September 18, 2012: CSFME contacts Blackrock/ICGN Chair for a brief on LDV.

August 13, 2012 – CSFME conference call with OTPP.  Discussion of LDV was not timely in that their SecLending Program stopped lending securities through agents in mid-2006. State Street is their custodian and they were using a tri-party repo through Chase to Lehman, until the Lehman collapse. All the assets sat at Chase. It was not clear who had voting rights. At the time of this discussion in August 2012, OTPP was thinking formulating an SLA because they do not have the capacity to lend securities on their own. We have had no discussion with them since.

August 2, 2012 – CSFME contacts Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTPP) regarding LDV.

March 19, 2012 – CSFME conference call with executive in charge of securities lending for Franklin Templeton

February 22, 2012ICGN sends LDV letter of support to the SEC, signed by Chairman of the ICGN Board of Governors.

September 30, 2011CalSTRS sends LDV letter of support to the SEC, signed by Director of Corporate Governance Anne Sheehan.

July 18, 2011Florida SBA sends LDV letter of support to the SEC, signed by Executive Director and Chief Investment Officer.

November 2011 – CSFME introduces Council of Institutional Investors editor to LDV.

July 5, 2011 – CSFME sends a Comment Letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission regarding LDV.

October 2010 – CSFME releases report: Borrowed Proxy Abuse: Real or Not? This report and the SEC’s Securities Lending and Short Selling Roundtable prompted the question from beneficial owners and regulators regarding the need to recall shares on loan to vote proxies, why can’t lenders receive proxies for shares on loan when we get the dividends? From this question, the idea for Lender Directed Voting was born.

January 2010 – SEC issues rules that brokers no longer have the discretion to vote their customers’ shares held in companies without receiving voting instructions from those customers about how to vote them in an election of directors. http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/votingrules2010.htm. The rule, periodically, contributed to the difficulty of corporate meetings attaining a quorum.

Fall 2009/2010 – Four public pension funds join CSFME in Empty Voting studies/LDV initiative; FL SBA, CalSTRS, SWIB and CoPERA.

September 29-30, 2009 - SEC Announces Panelists for Securities Lending and Short Sale Roundtable; http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-207.htm