Does Mandatory Shareholder Voting Prevent Bad Acquisitions?

Paper studies how much power shareholders should delegate to the board of directors.

In the United Kingdom, corporate acquisition deals larger than 25% in relative size are subject to a mandatory shareholder vote, while in most of continental Europe there is no vote, and in Delaware voting is largely discretionary. In a new paper by Marco Becht, Professor of Corporate Governance at the Université libre de Bruxelles; Andrea Polo of the Department of Economics and Business at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE; and Stefano Rossi of the Department of Finance at Purdue University studies the effect shareholder engagement has on preserving shareholder value in these kinds of large-scale acquisition transactions. Their study concludes that mandatory voting makes boards more likely to refrain from overpaying or from proposing deals that are not in the interest of shareholders.
Wednesday, July 23, 2014/Author: David Schwartz/Number of views (13675)/Comments (0)/
Tags:
RSS
12345678910Last