What is LDV ?

Who benefits from LDV?

LDV benefits all participants in the securities finance industry.  Lenders are better able to exercise their corporate governance responsibilities and, since lenders recall fewer loans, overall securities lending volume and revenue increase.  Loan, borrow, and collateral portfolios are more stable, allowing agents and brokers to more effectively manage investment, counterparty, and operational risks.  Corporate issuers receive more proxy votes from long-term investors, allowing them to reach quorum more quickly and at lower cost, and counterbalance votes of short-term activists.  Higher loan volumes also improve financial market liquidity and price discovery.

 

What is Lender-Directed Voting, or LDV?

LDV is a new process that matches securities lenders' loaned shares to broker securities that would otherwise go unvoted, enabling lenders to direct proxies without recalling loans.  It substantially improves existing market practices, which require lenders to recall loan in order to vote proxies.  Recalls are inefficient in that they reduce overall lending and borrowing revenue, and create instability in loan, borrow, and collateral portfolios. 

Why haven't lenders voted on loaned shares in the past?

Historically, institutional securities lenders had to forgo voting rights on loaned shares because there was no mechanism to vote without recalls.  Recent technology and transparency improvements in securities finance markets, however, enable loaned shares to be matched with broker shares that would otherwise go unvoted.  In particular, the Agent Lender Disclosure Initiative made apparent the direct counterparty relationship between lenders and broker-borrowers and provided brokers with detailed loan data necessary to include lenders in their proxy allocation routines.

Are there enough unvoted shares to cover lender voting interest?

Approximately 60 billion U.S. equities go unvoted each year[1], while roughly 15 billion shares are on loan[2], suggesting that sufficient votes could be available to meet lender vote demand.  However, it is unlikely that lender voting interest will be fully covered for all issues, such as those with particularly contentious proxy events or that are hard-to-borrow in securities lending markets. 


[1] www.broadridge.com/investor–communications /us/Broadridge_Proxy_Stats_2010.pdf
[2] Data from RMA securities lending composite, assuming $20 average stock price

Does the broker have the lender’s shares on the proxy record date?

1.  U.S. Federal Reserve Regulation T (“Reg T”) defines the permitted purposes for the extension of credit in the borrowing and lending of securities. In general, all of these purposes involve settling trades through re-delivery of the borrowed securities. Most often, the broker’s need to borrow has arisen after failing to receive securities required for an impending trade settlement, either as the result of an operational breakdown or after a short sale.

2.  Given the broker-borrower’s mandatory compliance with Reg T, it can be argued that borrowed shares, which are re-delivered in the settlement of a trade, are not available on the broker’s books (as a technical matter, the position would be held at DTCC) in order to earn voting rights on the proxy record date. However, this argument would only be true per se if the settlement took place on the proxy record date, because an analysis of the ongoing process reveals that the proxy votes, not just the entitled shares, are properly treated as fully fungible on the broker-borrower’s books.

3.  Reg T does not require that the borrowed shares be returned to the original lender when a subsequent receipt of securities is used to offset the original failure-to-receive. At that point, the borrower can certainly return the securities to the original lender. Yet, an active borrower can also compliantly decide to close a loan of the same securities with a different institutional lender whose terms may have become less attractive or from another broker-dealer lender who may be viewed as more likely to recall shares at an inconvenient time in the future, especially if the shares were borrowed for an ongoing short position. Still another reason may exist to hold the securities if the broker considers the return on its cash collateral, received through a rebate from the lender, to be very attractive compared with other investment options. In all those cases, as well as for actively traded issues where there may be a high risk of ongoing settlement failures, the broker can simply keep the newly-received shares in its inventory, balanced against its obligation to the lender.

4. As a result of efficient management of its settlement obligations, a broker – perhaps all brokers – may well have borrowed positions on their books on proxy record dates. The brokers would have gained the right to assign proxies or even to vote at the next corporate meeting as a direct result of the original loans from institutional lenders. In effect, the proxies are fungible on the brokers’ books, along with the borrowed shares themselves subject, of course, to an equitable assignment of proxy rights in compliance with stock exchange rules. Yet, brokers are not expressly permitted to assign proxies to their institutional lenders. At this point, the Lender Directed Voting (“LDV”) argument gains relevance and substance.

5. As noted, in addition to holding the shares cum voting rights, the broker also retains an obligation to its original lender. Indeed, one could argue that an institutional lender's ownership rights are stronger than those of other “beneficial owners” to whom the broker owes shares in the same securities. That is partly due to the distinction that can be drawn between the institutional lenders, who do not receive proxy assignments, and the broker’s own margin customers and hedge fund clients, who do receive proxy assignments. The distinction resides in the timeline of their property rights: the former owned the shares fully prior to lending them to the broker, while the latter required broker-financing in order to acquire their positions. Although we have seen that the institution’s shares may now be on the broker’s books, it is very likely that the financing customers’ shares are out on loan, i.e., hypothecated as collateral to source the broker’s own funding needs. And, in such cases, those positions are truly not in the brokers’ DTC account, although the brokers may well be assigning proxy rights to their accountholders. One can ably argue that those proxies would more equitably be assigned to the institutional lenders.

How can lenders instruct broker shares?

Brokers administer proxy allocation routines to distribute proxies to their customers.  Since broker shares are held in fungible bulk and lenders have beneficial ownership to loaned shares, brokers can include lenders in their allocation routines.  After brokers allocate proxies to lenders, standard proxy processes are followed to garner and submit voting instructions and submit them to corporate issuers.  For example, proxies are assigned to Broadridge accounts designated for the lenders, then are instructed by lenders or ISS on the lenders' behalf.

Could lenders also instruct custodians' unvoted shares?

Regulatory and operational considerations may pose challenges to matching custodians' unvoted shares with lenders’ loan positions.  In particular, custodian shares are not held in fungible bulk, as are broker shares, which presents difficulties when considering custodial allocation of proxies across lender accounts. Furthermore, custodians are not counterparties on loans, so the lenders are not beneficial owners to any of the custodians’ unvoted shares.

Does LDV contribute to “over-reporting,” since lenders’ shares were delivered to new buyers who now have the associated voting rights?

Existing proxy reconciliation processes are sufficient to address any potential "over-reporting" issues.  For example, brokers already use post-reconciliation processes to mitigate the risk of over-reporting that may arise from assigning proxies to margin customers whose shares may have been loaned or rehypothecated.

How do brokers decide which lender(s) are assigned proxies?

Beneficial owners and regulators have expressed concerns about voting opportunities being directed to preferred lenders or leveraged for beneficial loan terms.  In the same way that agent lending queues are designed so that lenders get equitable access to borrower demand, brokers need pre-defined and algorithmic “proxy queues” to ensure equitable assignment of voting opportunities.  Furthermore, on-going auditing and validation of proxy assignments may be needed to ensure against development of a “market for votes.” 

What if proxies are not available from a lender's borrower, but are from another broker?

Reallocation of the loans to brokers with available proxies would increase overall lender voting opportunities.  However, numerous other loan factors would need to be taken into account, such as counterparty risk assessments and credit limits, loan prices, and collateral types and quantity.  Considering these factors, loan reallocations may not be in the overall best interest of lenders and borrowers, and will have to be considered on a case-by-case basis.

How can lenders know, before record date, how many proxies they will be assigned?

To the extent that lenders receive proxies through LDV, they will not have to recall loans to regain voting rights.  However, broker holdings change daily and varying numbers of investors vote, so the number of proxies that can be assigned to lenders cannot be known with certainty until just before the meeting date, which is typically two months after lenders must make record date recall decisions.   The number of available proxies must therefore be forecasted, taking into account factors such as each broker's customer base, the scarcity of shares in the securities lending market, and the expected materiality of proxy ballot items.

Corporate Governance Blog

Tuesday, January 25, 2022

The Fed Weighs in on a 'Digital Dollar'

Vast Cross-border Implications for Central Bank Digital Currencies


Author: David Schwartz J.D. CPA

 

 

A discussion paper published on January 20th invites the public to explore with the U.S. Federal Reserve Board the creation of a digital version of the U.S. dollar. A Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) backed by the Federal Reserve would be designed, according to the Fed’s paper, to compete with cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum. Comments are due by May 20, 2022.

 

Official issuance of a U.S. Federal Reserve sponsored CBDC could change the global payment system as much as the 1971 U.S. decision to float the dollar and exit the gold standard. Setting aside monetary, legal, and legislative policy issues, a U.S. CBDC could force reengineering of the existing cross-border payment systems of companies and financial firms. For example, settling securities financing transactions through global custodian banks might no longer be the only option for cross-border traders using fintechs with a digital dollar account at the Federal Reserve.  

 

Other nations’ central banks have also explored digital versions of their own fiat currencies. Nine relatively small, mainly offshore nations have already launched central bank digital currencies. [1] While stressing that no final decisions about a digital currency have yet been reached, the Fed's paper said it would likely follow an "intermediated model" under which banks or payment firms would create accounts or digital wallets. [2]

 

CBDC’s are Not Cryptocurrencies

 

Cryptocurrencies lack sovereign backing or official convertibility and store value for their holders in tokens encrypted on a blockchain. By contrast, CBDC’s represent fiat currency, e.g., notes and coins, held in a digital wallet for conversion into physical cash at an ATM or bank.[3] The Bank for International Settlements defines state-backed CBDCs as either the retail equivalents of cash or as wholesale claims used for interbank payments.

 

The Fed’s paper distinguishes CBDCs from what it calls “commercial bank money” and “non-bank money,” which currently allow businesses and consumers to conduct digital commerce and transfer funds electronically.[4] A U.S. CBDC dollar, according to the Fed, would be a liability of the central bank, not a liability on the books of private banks or other financial institutions.[5]

 

Both cryptocurrencies and CBDCs are dependent on networked computer resources to create, track and validate transactions. In the case of most cryptocurrencies, those resources are anonymous and distributed through decentralized ledgers. For CBDC’s, a central bank ultimately controls issuance by providing every "e-dollar" with a unique identifying serial number, like a physical dollar. Because CBDCs are electronic analogs of a nation’s hard currency, central banks would be expected to peg the value of their digital currency to their existing fiat currency.[6]

 

Cryptocurrencies, according to a 2021 study by the Bank for International Settlements, have not yet made any real inroads into commercial cross-border transaction settlements. Their novelty, volatility, and general lack of centralized monetary controls have so far made them unsuitable to use as a medium of exchange for most businesses and financial firms.

 

 U.S. Dollar Hegemony is at Risk from Competing Digital Currencies

 

The Fed’s report acknowledges that without a dollar-denominated CBDC, the U.S. Dollar runs the risk of being eclipsed by competing countries’ CBDCs. 

 

“Today, the dollar is widely used across the globe because of the depth and liquidity of U.S. financial markets, the size and openness of the U.S. economy, and international trust in U.S. institutions and rule of law. It is important, however, to consider the implications of a potential future state in which many foreign countries and currency unions may have introduced CBDCs. Some have suggested that, if these new CBDCs were more attractive than existing forms of the U.S. dollar, global use of the dollar could decrease—and a U.S. CBDC might help preserve the international role of the dollar.”[7]

 

A digital dollar would compete with other nations’ CBDCs for cross-border transactions. For example, China’s digital currency, the renminbi (or e-CNY), could allow Chinese firms and their trading partners to reduce the usage of the U.S. dollar for cross-border transactions and perhaps circumvent channels that may be vulnerable to U.S. sanctions or jurisdictional control. To compete, the Fed must address the pain points in the cross-border payment markets.

 

“Accordingly, efforts aimed at reducing the costs of existing payments channels for large-value cross-border transactions denominated in U.S. dollars should be accelerated, and Washington should support public- and private-sector efforts aimed at leveraging new technologies to improve the efficiency of large-value cross-border payments [or else] the United States risks losing its leading influence over global payments infrastructure."[8]

 

CBDCs can Improve Efficiency of Cross-border Trading

 

Inefficiencies and high costs associated with the current cross-border payment systems have been a focus of global policymakers for years. The G20 countries agreed in 2020 to a multiyear roadmap to identify and deploy improvements to cross-border payments, including exploring the potential benefits of CBDCs to help address these frictions.[9]

 

“Cross-border payments currently face a number of challenges, including slow settlement, high fees, and limited accessibility. The sources of these frictions include the mechanics of currency exchange, variations in different countries’ legal regimes and technological infrastructure, timezone complications, and coordination problems among intermediaries, including correspondent banks and nonbank financial service providers. Regulatory requirements related to money laundering and other illicit activities introduce further complications."[10]

 

Champions of a digital dollar estimate that the streamlining cross-border exchanges made possible by CBDCs could dramatically reduce transaction costs, freeing up capital that could be more productively employed.

 

“Global corporates move nearly $23.5 trillion across countries annually, equivalent to about 25% of global GDP. To do this, they have to rely on wholesale cross-border payment processes which remain sub-optimal from a cost, speed, and transparency standpoint. As well as resulting in significant transaction costs of $120 billion per annum, these processes also result in additional costs from FX conversion, trapped liquidity and delayed settlements."[11]

 

In a trial conducted by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), cross-border transactions employing CBDCs could be made in a few seconds, instead of the three to five days necessary using payments passed through a network of banks.[12]

 


[1] Nine countries have launched CBDCs: Antiqua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Nigeria, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and The Bahamas. Fourteen nations, including China and Saudi Arabia, have CBDC pilots. Sixteen countries have CBDCs under development, including Canada, Brazil, Russia, and Australia. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/cbdctracker/ 

[2] The Fed is also exploring an alternative system that permits the issuance of digital dollars directly to consumers. But as the paper notes, “the Federal Reserve Act does not authorize direct Federal Reserve accounts for individuals, and such accounts would represent a significant expansion of the Federal Reserve’s role in the financial system and the economy.” 

Federal Reserve Board, “Money and Payments: The U.S. Dollar in the Age of Digital Transformation,” Jan. 2022, p. 13. (“Fed CBDC Report”).

[3] Chadha, Sunainaa, "Digital Currency vs Cryptocurrency: What the Row is all About," Times of India, Nov. 25, 2021. 

[4] According to the Fed:

  • Commercial bank money is the digital form of money that is most commonly used by the public. Commercial bank money is held in accounts at commercial banks. 
  • Nonbank money is digital money held as balances at nonbank financial service providers. These firms typically conduct balance transfers on their own books using a range of technologies,  including mobile apps.  Fed CBDC Report, p. 15.

[5]  Fed CBDC Report, pp.13-14.

[6] CBDCs are alternatively called “digital fiat currencies.”

[7] Fed CBDC Report, p. 15.

[8] Greene, Robert, "Beijing’s Global Ambitions for Central Bank Digital Currencies Are Growing Clearer," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Oct. 6, 2021 

[9] See “Financial Stability Board, “Enhancing Cross-border Payments: Stage 3 Roadmap”, Oct. 2020 

[10] Fed CBDC Report, p. 9.

[11] JP Morgan & Oliver Wyman, “Unlocking $120 billion in Cross-Border Payments: How Banks can Leverage Digital Currencies for Corporates,” 2021. 

[12] Bank for International Settlements, “Project Helvetia Phase II: Settling tokenised assets in wholesale CBDC,” Jan. 13, 2022

 

 

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Corporate Outreach Milestones

MILESTONES FOR LENDER DIRECTED VOTING

May 8, 2014: Council of Institutional Investors; - CII Elects New Board, Names Jay Chaudhuri Board Chair. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-31/north-carolina-treasurer-may-cede-pension-control-5-questions.html )

February 2014:  Swiss Minder Initiative implies the value of LDV. http://www.ipe.com/switzerlands-minder-initiative-will-cripple-securities-lending-experts-warn/10000947.article.

January 2014FL SBA begins their SecLending Auction Program with eSecLending.

November 27, 2013 – CSFME staff call with Glass Lewis Chief Operating Officer. He gave his commitment for cooperation and support for LDV, and most importantly, he suggested that perhaps we should discuss with a Broadridge/State Street/Citi the scenario that permits Citi to forward an “Omnibus Ballot” of proxies to State Street, which State Street would then take and assign the proxies to their pension lenders/LDV participants, which would then be incorporated into a single ballot and sent to Broadridge. This eliminates the secondary ballot issue. While this description is oversimplified, Glass Lewis was fairly certain the parties involved could operationally create such a combined ballot. Responding to the question on cost, the Glass Lewis executive stated that the cost depends on the number of voting policies a fund has. Most funds have one policy; therefore, depending on the client, the cost would be $.75 – $2.00 per ballot.

October 21, 2013 – CSFME staff call with ISS Chief Operations Officer. He committed his cooperation and support to advance LDV’s implementation into the markets. He responded to the question about cost: “It depends on the client and the services they use. $6-7 per ballot on average.”

June 25-28, 2013 – CSFME staff attended ICGN Annual Conference in NY, NY. Spoke with executives of CalSTRS; ICGN Chair and Blackrock about LDV.  We received favorable comments and encouragement from each.

June 6, 2013: CSFME meets with Chief Investment Officer for NYC Pension Funds. While very much in favor of the LDV concept, the comments that the NYC Pension Fund Boards are for the most part followers in new initiatives and would prefer a roll-out by other funds first.

April 5, 2013: ‘SEC gives CSFME limited approval for LDV going forward’ providing brokers assign proxies only from their proprietary shares.

March 26, 2013 – CSFME and its legal team presented the case for LDV to SEC Commissioner Dan Gallagher. Present by phone and speaking on behalf of LDV were representatives of FL SBA who spoke about the difficulty of timely recall of shares on loan following release of record date and issues on agenda; and a representative from CalSTRS who spoke about their recall policy affecting income.

March 13, 2013 – CSFME meet staff of Senator Rob Portman and Congressman Steve Stivers of Ohio. These meetings were for the purpose of lining up political support, should the SEC resist the LDV concept. We also met and spoke with CII Deputy Director Amy Borrus for one hour and 15 minutes for a scheduled 30 minute meeting.  She expressed great interest in the value of LDV to long-term beneficial owners.

January 17, 2013 – CSFME conference call with CoPERA Director of Investments.  Among CoPERA’s concerns were: (1) How are agents/brokers notified re: LDV? (2) Who moves or approaches first lender to agent or agent to lender? CSFME responds  that a side letter is needed between lender, agent and broker.

November 8, 2012 – CSFME conference call with Council of Institutional Investors (CII) detailing LDV. Some in attendance were opposed to securities lending because of their desire to vote 100% of recall. This position would be irrelevant giving CalSTRS’ change to policy on proxy recall.

October 24, 2012, 2PM – CSFME presents LDV to Broadridge Institutional Investor Group. At this meeting, a representative of CalSTRS states: “We would view brokers willing to provide proxies more favorably than those who would not.” We were also informed by CalSTRS that they were looking to change their 100% recall policy. A representative of SWIB led a discussion on International Voting Issues, and apparently was chairing 3 meetings to determine the following: 1. who is voting internationally? 2. What are the issues in the international markets? 3. How do we increase and improve international processes?

October 24, 2012, 11AM – EWB/KT conference call with ICGN.  Executives stated that the argument for LDV may not be as strong in a non-record date market, and asked what would be the cost for LDV.  They further stated that they would like to see the U.S. go with LDV first and would need more information and operational detail.

October 13, 2012 email note from Elizabeth Danese Mozely to Broadridge’s Institutional Investor Working Group: “TerriJo Saarela, State of Wisconsin Investment Board, will provide commentary on their fund’s interest in international voting and an update on her participation in the Council of Institutional Investors’ working group on international voting.  Our discussion will include the differences in process for voting abroad, share blocking, attendance at the meeting via proxy or Power of Attorney (POA), best practices available through the various laws and regulations, etc.”

September 18, 2012: CSFME contacts Blackrock/ICGN Chair for a brief on LDV.

August 13, 2012 – CSFME conference call with OTPP.  Discussion of LDV was not timely in that their SecLending Program stopped lending securities through agents in mid-2006. State Street is their custodian and they were using a tri-party repo through Chase to Lehman, until the Lehman collapse. All the assets sat at Chase. It was not clear who had voting rights. At the time of this discussion in August 2012, OTPP was thinking formulating an SLA because they do not have the capacity to lend securities on their own. We have had no discussion with them since.

August 2, 2012 – CSFME contacts Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTPP) regarding LDV.

March 19, 2012 – CSFME conference call with executive in charge of securities lending for Franklin Templeton

February 22, 2012ICGN sends LDV letter of support to the SEC, signed by Chairman of the ICGN Board of Governors.

September 30, 2011CalSTRS sends LDV letter of support to the SEC, signed by Director of Corporate Governance Anne Sheehan.

July 18, 2011Florida SBA sends LDV letter of support to the SEC, signed by Executive Director and Chief Investment Officer.

November 2011 – CSFME introduces Council of Institutional Investors editor to LDV.

July 5, 2011 – CSFME sends a Comment Letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission regarding LDV.

October 2010 – CSFME releases report: Borrowed Proxy Abuse: Real or Not? This report and the SEC’s Securities Lending and Short Selling Roundtable prompted the question from beneficial owners and regulators regarding the need to recall shares on loan to vote proxies, why can’t lenders receive proxies for shares on loan when we get the dividends? From this question, the idea for Lender Directed Voting was born.

January 2010 – SEC issues rules that brokers no longer have the discretion to vote their customers’ shares held in companies without receiving voting instructions from those customers about how to vote them in an election of directors. http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/votingrules2010.htm. The rule, periodically, contributed to the difficulty of corporate meetings attaining a quorum.

Fall 2009/2010 – Four public pension funds join CSFME in Empty Voting studies/LDV initiative; FL SBA, CalSTRS, SWIB and CoPERA.

September 29-30, 2009 - SEC Announces Panelists for Securities Lending and Short Sale Roundtable; http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-207.htm