News
Improved Analytics Can Help to Monitor Systemic Linkages
Dr. Franz-Christoph Zeitler, vice president of the Deutsche Bundsbank, speaking in Frankfurt on September 24, 2009, noted the failures of backward-looking quantitative risk measurement methods, such as value-at-risk or expected- shortfall models, which “have proved necessary but inadequate and should be supplemented by forward-looking instruments such as stress tests and scenario analyses, which also take into account changes in third party behaviour.” On the same day, Dr. Weber was speaking on the same topic, as were other central bankers around the world.
International Regulatory Cooperation will never be Easy
In a recent speech by Norwegian central banker Svein Gjedrem, the case for broader involvement by smaller banks is laid out. Instead of the G20, Mr. Gjedrem argues that the 180-member International Monetary Fund should serve as the main decision- making body for the funding of systemic risk mitigators.
Funding Markets must be made more stable
As recently as 4Q09, the European Central Bank was dealing with challenges in the funding markets, noting that, “Funding liquidity problems continue to bring pressure on the major banks’ operations. While the conditions have improved substantially in most funding segments throughout 2009, including the money markets, some of these institutions and parts of the broader euro area banking system, remain reliant on temporary support measures extended by the Eurosystem and governments.”
Integrated Markets led to ‘Shocking’ Instabilities
Prior to the Crisis, it was thought that diversification of counterparty networks would work to reduce systemic risk in the financial system.
More Intelligence is Needed from (and for) Market Participants
Regulators intend to increase the flows of bilateral information so as to isolate sources of risk as well as the ability of market participants to improve their risk management and business models. European Central Bank: Any well-functioning macro-supervisory framework needs the support of market participants, because a rigorous monitoring of systemic risks will require continuous market intelligence.
Regulatory Failure is not an Option
European Central Bank: We have to succeed. At stake is not only the stability of one of the world’s largest financial systems, but also the support from the over 490 million citizens in the European Union who are watching our efforts very closely. We have counted very heavily on their support for the financial system, and they would not forgive us if we had to do so a second time.
Capital Minimums, Liquidity Buffers and Regulatory Scope must Increase
Higher capital levels are expected to form the best long-term protection, just as more liquidity will be the best buffer for short-term stresses. To insure that financial defenses are uniformly adopted, global supervisors recommend the inclusion of all business models and market domains.
MegaBank Failure must become a Viable Option
The Swiss National Bank believes that resolution measures are needed to liquidate international banks without terminal damage to the real economy. “Too big to fail” and “too big to rescue” are the biggest challenges facing regulators today:
Systemic Risk Controls Will Require Statutory Integration
Many free-market economists and politicians are concerned about the potential for loss of sovereignty when agreeing to international cooperation at a level never before considered. It may well be that the first test for many countries will be during the legislative process, when decisions must be made about enacting the recommendations of the international regulatory bodies. The United States will not move precipitously, if past experience with the Basel capital reforms can serve as a precedent.
Causes of the credit crisis
The Bank of England has called the Credit Crisis an “extraordinary period” which will have “deep and long-lasting consequences” for the global capital markets. The United States Federal Reserve has said the “the sources of the crisis were extraordinarily complex and numerous,” but at the root was the Fed’s belief that banks’ “risk management systems were inadequate and their capital and equity buffers insufficient.”