What is LDV ?

Who benefits from LDV?

LDV benefits all participants in the securities finance industry.  Lenders are better able to exercise their corporate governance responsibilities and, since lenders recall fewer loans, overall securities lending volume and revenue increase.  Loan, borrow, and collateral portfolios are more stable, allowing agents and brokers to more effectively manage investment, counterparty, and operational risks.  Corporate issuers receive more proxy votes from long-term investors, allowing them to reach quorum more quickly and at lower cost, and counterbalance votes of short-term activists.  Higher loan volumes also improve financial market liquidity and price discovery.

 

What is Lender-Directed Voting, or LDV?

LDV is a new process that matches securities lenders' loaned shares to broker securities that would otherwise go unvoted, enabling lenders to direct proxies without recalling loans.  It substantially improves existing market practices, which require lenders to recall loan in order to vote proxies.  Recalls are inefficient in that they reduce overall lending and borrowing revenue, and create instability in loan, borrow, and collateral portfolios. 

Why haven't lenders voted on loaned shares in the past?

Historically, institutional securities lenders had to forgo voting rights on loaned shares because there was no mechanism to vote without recalls.  Recent technology and transparency improvements in securities finance markets, however, enable loaned shares to be matched with broker shares that would otherwise go unvoted.  In particular, the Agent Lender Disclosure Initiative made apparent the direct counterparty relationship between lenders and broker-borrowers and provided brokers with detailed loan data necessary to include lenders in their proxy allocation routines.

Are there enough unvoted shares to cover lender voting interest?

Approximately 60 billion U.S. equities go unvoted each year[1], while roughly 15 billion shares are on loan[2], suggesting that sufficient votes could be available to meet lender vote demand.  However, it is unlikely that lender voting interest will be fully covered for all issues, such as those with particularly contentious proxy events or that are hard-to-borrow in securities lending markets. 


[1] www.broadridge.com/investor–communications /us/Broadridge_Proxy_Stats_2010.pdf
[2] Data from RMA securities lending composite, assuming $20 average stock price

Does the broker have the lender’s shares on the proxy record date?

1.  U.S. Federal Reserve Regulation T (“Reg T”) defines the permitted purposes for the extension of credit in the borrowing and lending of securities. In general, all of these purposes involve settling trades through re-delivery of the borrowed securities. Most often, the broker’s need to borrow has arisen after failing to receive securities required for an impending trade settlement, either as the result of an operational breakdown or after a short sale.

2.  Given the broker-borrower’s mandatory compliance with Reg T, it can be argued that borrowed shares, which are re-delivered in the settlement of a trade, are not available on the broker’s books (as a technical matter, the position would be held at DTCC) in order to earn voting rights on the proxy record date. However, this argument would only be true per se if the settlement took place on the proxy record date, because an analysis of the ongoing process reveals that the proxy votes, not just the entitled shares, are properly treated as fully fungible on the broker-borrower’s books.

3.  Reg T does not require that the borrowed shares be returned to the original lender when a subsequent receipt of securities is used to offset the original failure-to-receive. At that point, the borrower can certainly return the securities to the original lender. Yet, an active borrower can also compliantly decide to close a loan of the same securities with a different institutional lender whose terms may have become less attractive or from another broker-dealer lender who may be viewed as more likely to recall shares at an inconvenient time in the future, especially if the shares were borrowed for an ongoing short position. Still another reason may exist to hold the securities if the broker considers the return on its cash collateral, received through a rebate from the lender, to be very attractive compared with other investment options. In all those cases, as well as for actively traded issues where there may be a high risk of ongoing settlement failures, the broker can simply keep the newly-received shares in its inventory, balanced against its obligation to the lender.

4. As a result of efficient management of its settlement obligations, a broker – perhaps all brokers – may well have borrowed positions on their books on proxy record dates. The brokers would have gained the right to assign proxies or even to vote at the next corporate meeting as a direct result of the original loans from institutional lenders. In effect, the proxies are fungible on the brokers’ books, along with the borrowed shares themselves subject, of course, to an equitable assignment of proxy rights in compliance with stock exchange rules. Yet, brokers are not expressly permitted to assign proxies to their institutional lenders. At this point, the Lender Directed Voting (“LDV”) argument gains relevance and substance.

5. As noted, in addition to holding the shares cum voting rights, the broker also retains an obligation to its original lender. Indeed, one could argue that an institutional lender's ownership rights are stronger than those of other “beneficial owners” to whom the broker owes shares in the same securities. That is partly due to the distinction that can be drawn between the institutional lenders, who do not receive proxy assignments, and the broker’s own margin customers and hedge fund clients, who do receive proxy assignments. The distinction resides in the timeline of their property rights: the former owned the shares fully prior to lending them to the broker, while the latter required broker-financing in order to acquire their positions. Although we have seen that the institution’s shares may now be on the broker’s books, it is very likely that the financing customers’ shares are out on loan, i.e., hypothecated as collateral to source the broker’s own funding needs. And, in such cases, those positions are truly not in the brokers’ DTC account, although the brokers may well be assigning proxy rights to their accountholders. One can ably argue that those proxies would more equitably be assigned to the institutional lenders.

How can lenders instruct broker shares?

Brokers administer proxy allocation routines to distribute proxies to their customers.  Since broker shares are held in fungible bulk and lenders have beneficial ownership to loaned shares, brokers can include lenders in their allocation routines.  After brokers allocate proxies to lenders, standard proxy processes are followed to garner and submit voting instructions and submit them to corporate issuers.  For example, proxies are assigned to Broadridge accounts designated for the lenders, then are instructed by lenders or ISS on the lenders' behalf.

Could lenders also instruct custodians' unvoted shares?

Regulatory and operational considerations may pose challenges to matching custodians' unvoted shares with lenders’ loan positions.  In particular, custodian shares are not held in fungible bulk, as are broker shares, which presents difficulties when considering custodial allocation of proxies across lender accounts. Furthermore, custodians are not counterparties on loans, so the lenders are not beneficial owners to any of the custodians’ unvoted shares.

Does LDV contribute to “over-reporting,” since lenders’ shares were delivered to new buyers who now have the associated voting rights?

Existing proxy reconciliation processes are sufficient to address any potential "over-reporting" issues.  For example, brokers already use post-reconciliation processes to mitigate the risk of over-reporting that may arise from assigning proxies to margin customers whose shares may have been loaned or rehypothecated.

How do brokers decide which lender(s) are assigned proxies?

Beneficial owners and regulators have expressed concerns about voting opportunities being directed to preferred lenders or leveraged for beneficial loan terms.  In the same way that agent lending queues are designed so that lenders get equitable access to borrower demand, brokers need pre-defined and algorithmic “proxy queues” to ensure equitable assignment of voting opportunities.  Furthermore, on-going auditing and validation of proxy assignments may be needed to ensure against development of a “market for votes.” 

What if proxies are not available from a lender's borrower, but are from another broker?

Reallocation of the loans to brokers with available proxies would increase overall lender voting opportunities.  However, numerous other loan factors would need to be taken into account, such as counterparty risk assessments and credit limits, loan prices, and collateral types and quantity.  Considering these factors, loan reallocations may not be in the overall best interest of lenders and borrowers, and will have to be considered on a case-by-case basis.

How can lenders know, before record date, how many proxies they will be assigned?

To the extent that lenders receive proxies through LDV, they will not have to recall loans to regain voting rights.  However, broker holdings change daily and varying numbers of investors vote, so the number of proxies that can be assigned to lenders cannot be known with certainty until just before the meeting date, which is typically two months after lenders must make record date recall decisions.   The number of available proxies must therefore be forecasted, taking into account factors such as each broker's customer base, the scarcity of shares in the securities lending market, and the expected materiality of proxy ballot items.

Corporate Governance Blog

Friday, October 27, 2023

Beyond Benchmarking: The Race to Predictive Analytics in Securities Finance

10C-1 public data can reveal Watch Lists, but vendor data can predict market leverage and fees


Author: Ed Blount

 

Data engineering by Dan Hammond

When, on October 13, 2023, the Securities and Exchange Commission released its long-awaited final 10c-1 rule on reporting and public disclosure of securities loans (explained here), the most important passage, at least to the commercial data vendors who support the securities finance community, stated that, "the final rule could render existing securities lending data services less valuable, potentially leading to less revenue for the firms currently compiling and distributing these data for a fee."[1] But is that true? Are bonuses and careers really at risk?? As shown in the table below, there is hope for vendors because the public data release will either omit or delay several data elements that are crucial to many important vendor applications today.

Table 1 Data Elements available to securities finance analysts, now and as mandated.

Notes: New rule 10c-1 requires daily submission of confidential loan data to the SEC, as well as partial fail data
if shares are borrowed to avoid Reg SHO buy-ins. Public data disclosures will be available from FINRA no later
than next morning (X) after each loan is effected or delayed 20 days (Y). For vendor availability, please refer to
data dictionaries and subscriber restrictions.

Modern benchmarking of performance as a securities lender requires comparison to the results of similar funds that, since neither lenders nor borrowers will be disclosed to the public, will be impossible with public data alone. Benchmarking vendors today use fund type codes from service providers to create peer reviews. Without adjustments for the lender’s portfolio composition or investment style, it will not be possible to group similar lenders. However, the vendor advantage may be short lived if large competitors can use public data to extrapolate or validate their B2B datasets. Lending agents who are now benchmarking customers of vendors may elect to use the tens of millions of loan data records and modifications that will be released each month as a resource to train their own generative AI models to predict borrower demand and fees, inventory fails and other key performance metrics.

Accurate market sizing will enable database engineers to calibrate the statistical significance of smaller sample sizes when publishing benchmarks or indexes.  As the SEC pointed out, the public market data will raise the competitive bar by enabling new services[2] to complement opportunities in advanced analytics.[3] Fintechs will see product opportunities in the more than one million records submitted daily from service providers on behalf of market participants.

We can use a well-known episode in recent market history to illustrate how public and vendor securities lending data can be combined to better understand how securities finance imposes credit constraints that limit the excesses in trading markets. In March 2021, Archegos, a family office with experienced hedge fund managers and a multi-billion dollar portfolio, leveraged single name swaps to rig the market for CBS Viacom (VIAC) shares and a dozen other issues (read more here).

As shown in Figure 1, a simple comparison of new loans to the stock price would have revealed the activity of short sellers to the Archegos pump-and-dump scheme. New loan data will be available in the 10c-1 release. However, vendor data would be needed to advance the analytics. With enrichment of public datasets by benchmarkers, e.g., by adding aggregate loan size, tenure of returns, and units outstanding, even the most basic GenAI models could have estimated the unrealized gains/losses of strategic short sellers, as their models reacted to the leverage of Archegos. More advanced GenAI models, enriched by details at the trade ticket level, could also have generated recommendations for inventory buffers and smart recalls to comply with voting stewardship reports.

Trading Analytics at the Next Level

Outstanding units on loan is one of the simplest and still best indicators of market leverage.[4] As shown in Figures 2 and 3, conditions in the securities funding market for VIAC shares during the Archegos manipulation were much tighter than in the prior quarter.

These are useful values in predictive analytics but only available to vendors’ customers. As used in Figure 3, the aging of returned loans can be used to infer the strategies being followed by borrowers. (For example, long term loans being returned implies the buy-in of short positions by directional hedge funds.) If borrowers can be analyzed as a basket of loans, then any change in that basket’s aging can signal a shift in dominant style, both for markets and individual counterparties.

Product managers at fintechs will use the public data reports to create the Market Posse chart shown in Figure 4, which shows the inflection point at which the bubble was burst by tactical short sellers. Transaction-level data is needed for semi-supervised learning in generative ai, starting with peer clustering. Models of risk tolerances, preferences, and other factors can be used to create a world within the real world. However, the total of loaned volume in each synthetic model must be constrained to the disclosed metrics. Within those limits, dispersion models of synthetic borrowers can be generated with risk profiles for a large number of security baskets. Securities lenders could then match the risk profiles of their actual borrowers to the synthetic profiles on a real-time basis.

A more advanced data set can be used to train loan risk classification models for use by an enabling platform to predict and avoid stock loan defaults by borrowers. Pooled ticket level data from the beneficial owners of a data trust can provide that more granular dataset to improve their ability to optimize lendable portfolio inventories. (Read more here.)

Counterparties approaching their risk tolerance limits can be prioritized by lending agents as targets for smart recalls. GenAI models with an enabling platform can trim, at the very least, their lenders' marginal periods of risk and potential exposure at default. That can spell major savings in economic capital charges.

New Opportunities for Data Vendors

Through a variety of methods, lending agents monitor those of their counterparties who most closely fit the riskiest profiles they see on the market surface. By embedding that expertise in genAI models, synthetic counterparties can be created for lending agents from enriched loan data to train deep learning models. Agents will want the most reliable datasets for training their distribution queues and prime brokers will want vendors to enrich their dynamic margining algorithms for selected asset classes or issues. These are quite literally golden opportunities for vendors.

The best data products will help to reduce the costs of fails after the T+1 settlement upgrade in the U.S. and may argue for lowering the higher risk-weighted asset (RWA) capital charges for borrower default indemnification under Basel III+. Lending agents for U. S. mutual funds will offer analytics that predict fails and avoid N-PX penalties. The most successful vendors will offer upgraded analytic platforms, such as FISʼ Lending Pit, that can turn raw data into the parameters needed by generativeAI models. Shared ledgers will use plug-in APIs to mix the predictive analytics with their customersʼ own risk management platforms.

Predictive analytics based on enriched loan filings can help with dynamic management of buffers in a straight through processing environment to minimize settlement delays. Costly inventory fails-to- deliver and CSDR-like penalties from their global custodians are not the only costs; fails may also be leading indicators of default for overleveraged counterparties, such as in the Archegos scheme.

 

[1] Securities and Exchange Commission, Release No. 34-98737; File No. S7-18-21, page 178

[2] “The use of third-party vendors by covered persons could enable the innovation and development of novel reporting services, such as the data trusts described by one commenter.  See Advanced Securities Consulting Letter.” Ibid, footnote 190, page 45

[3] “The Commission believes that a potential mitigating factor that may reduce or even offset the severity of this loss in revenue will be that commercial data vendors may offset some of the impact of lowered demand for their data by enhancing their related data analytics businesses using Rule 10c-1a data.” Ibid, page 275; “To the extent that customers value the availability of information about securities available to lend and utilization rates, the fact that commercial data vendors will continue to have superior access to this information will likely mitigate or even offset a decrease in demand, as investors would continue to purchase commercial datasets in order to gain access to this information.”

[4] In the final rule, the proposed obligation to report outstanding and available loan position data was eliminated. In effect, the SEC carved out a base upon which data vendors might advance their business models with a mix of existing and enriched datasets.

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Corporate Outreach Milestones

MILESTONES FOR LENDER DIRECTED VOTING

May 8, 2014: Council of Institutional Investors; - CII Elects New Board, Names Jay Chaudhuri Board Chair. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-31/north-carolina-treasurer-may-cede-pension-control-5-questions.html )

February 2014:  Swiss Minder Initiative implies the value of LDV. http://www.ipe.com/switzerlands-minder-initiative-will-cripple-securities-lending-experts-warn/10000947.article.

January 2014FL SBA begins their SecLending Auction Program with eSecLending.

November 27, 2013 – CSFME staff call with Glass Lewis Chief Operating Officer. He gave his commitment for cooperation and support for LDV, and most importantly, he suggested that perhaps we should discuss with a Broadridge/State Street/Citi the scenario that permits Citi to forward an “Omnibus Ballot” of proxies to State Street, which State Street would then take and assign the proxies to their pension lenders/LDV participants, which would then be incorporated into a single ballot and sent to Broadridge. This eliminates the secondary ballot issue. While this description is oversimplified, Glass Lewis was fairly certain the parties involved could operationally create such a combined ballot. Responding to the question on cost, the Glass Lewis executive stated that the cost depends on the number of voting policies a fund has. Most funds have one policy; therefore, depending on the client, the cost would be $.75 – $2.00 per ballot.

October 21, 2013 – CSFME staff call with ISS Chief Operations Officer. He committed his cooperation and support to advance LDV’s implementation into the markets. He responded to the question about cost: “It depends on the client and the services they use. $6-7 per ballot on average.”

June 25-28, 2013 – CSFME staff attended ICGN Annual Conference in NY, NY. Spoke with executives of CalSTRS; ICGN Chair and Blackrock about LDV.  We received favorable comments and encouragement from each.

June 6, 2013: CSFME meets with Chief Investment Officer for NYC Pension Funds. While very much in favor of the LDV concept, the comments that the NYC Pension Fund Boards are for the most part followers in new initiatives and would prefer a roll-out by other funds first.

April 5, 2013: ‘SEC gives CSFME limited approval for LDV going forward’ providing brokers assign proxies only from their proprietary shares.

March 26, 2013 – CSFME and its legal team presented the case for LDV to SEC Commissioner Dan Gallagher. Present by phone and speaking on behalf of LDV were representatives of FL SBA who spoke about the difficulty of timely recall of shares on loan following release of record date and issues on agenda; and a representative from CalSTRS who spoke about their recall policy affecting income.

March 13, 2013 – CSFME meet staff of Senator Rob Portman and Congressman Steve Stivers of Ohio. These meetings were for the purpose of lining up political support, should the SEC resist the LDV concept. We also met and spoke with CII Deputy Director Amy Borrus for one hour and 15 minutes for a scheduled 30 minute meeting.  She expressed great interest in the value of LDV to long-term beneficial owners.

January 17, 2013 – CSFME conference call with CoPERA Director of Investments.  Among CoPERA’s concerns were: (1) How are agents/brokers notified re: LDV? (2) Who moves or approaches first lender to agent or agent to lender? CSFME responds  that a side letter is needed between lender, agent and broker.

November 8, 2012 – CSFME conference call with Council of Institutional Investors (CII) detailing LDV. Some in attendance were opposed to securities lending because of their desire to vote 100% of recall. This position would be irrelevant giving CalSTRS’ change to policy on proxy recall.

October 24, 2012, 2PM – CSFME presents LDV to Broadridge Institutional Investor Group. At this meeting, a representative of CalSTRS states: “We would view brokers willing to provide proxies more favorably than those who would not.” We were also informed by CalSTRS that they were looking to change their 100% recall policy. A representative of SWIB led a discussion on International Voting Issues, and apparently was chairing 3 meetings to determine the following: 1. who is voting internationally? 2. What are the issues in the international markets? 3. How do we increase and improve international processes?

October 24, 2012, 11AM – EWB/KT conference call with ICGN.  Executives stated that the argument for LDV may not be as strong in a non-record date market, and asked what would be the cost for LDV.  They further stated that they would like to see the U.S. go with LDV first and would need more information and operational detail.

October 13, 2012 email note from Elizabeth Danese Mozely to Broadridge’s Institutional Investor Working Group: “TerriJo Saarela, State of Wisconsin Investment Board, will provide commentary on their fund’s interest in international voting and an update on her participation in the Council of Institutional Investors’ working group on international voting.  Our discussion will include the differences in process for voting abroad, share blocking, attendance at the meeting via proxy or Power of Attorney (POA), best practices available through the various laws and regulations, etc.”

September 18, 2012: CSFME contacts Blackrock/ICGN Chair for a brief on LDV.

August 13, 2012 – CSFME conference call with OTPP.  Discussion of LDV was not timely in that their SecLending Program stopped lending securities through agents in mid-2006. State Street is their custodian and they were using a tri-party repo through Chase to Lehman, until the Lehman collapse. All the assets sat at Chase. It was not clear who had voting rights. At the time of this discussion in August 2012, OTPP was thinking formulating an SLA because they do not have the capacity to lend securities on their own. We have had no discussion with them since.

August 2, 2012 – CSFME contacts Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTPP) regarding LDV.

March 19, 2012 – CSFME conference call with executive in charge of securities lending for Franklin Templeton

February 22, 2012ICGN sends LDV letter of support to the SEC, signed by Chairman of the ICGN Board of Governors.

September 30, 2011CalSTRS sends LDV letter of support to the SEC, signed by Director of Corporate Governance Anne Sheehan.

July 18, 2011Florida SBA sends LDV letter of support to the SEC, signed by Executive Director and Chief Investment Officer.

November 2011 – CSFME introduces Council of Institutional Investors editor to LDV.

July 5, 2011 – CSFME sends a Comment Letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission regarding LDV.

October 2010 – CSFME releases report: Borrowed Proxy Abuse: Real or Not? This report and the SEC’s Securities Lending and Short Selling Roundtable prompted the question from beneficial owners and regulators regarding the need to recall shares on loan to vote proxies, why can’t lenders receive proxies for shares on loan when we get the dividends? From this question, the idea for Lender Directed Voting was born.

January 2010 – SEC issues rules that brokers no longer have the discretion to vote their customers’ shares held in companies without receiving voting instructions from those customers about how to vote them in an election of directors. http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/votingrules2010.htm. The rule, periodically, contributed to the difficulty of corporate meetings attaining a quorum.

Fall 2009/2010 – Four public pension funds join CSFME in Empty Voting studies/LDV initiative; FL SBA, CalSTRS, SWIB and CoPERA.

September 29-30, 2009 - SEC Announces Panelists for Securities Lending and Short Sale Roundtable; http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-207.htm