Outreach Blog

Monday, November 8, 2021

Exposing the Rogue Traders

The Case for a Cross-Border Stock Loan Registry, Part II


Author: Ed Blount

RogueTraderDigitalMarket

Master Criminals don’t usually confess in public. If prosecutors’ charges are true, Sanjay Shah is the leading figure in the largest reported tax swindle in history. Yet, Mr. Shah, unbowed, pleading his case to reporters, has openly admitted to borrowing the assets of widows and orphans in one country to kick-start a pyramid scheme of dividend capture trades, so as to swindle widows and orphans in other countries. Mr. Shah’s attorneys argue that his trades were not illegal. Mr. Shah, according to the reporters, claims everything he did was legal, and then he appeals to the Law of the Jungle:

 

“If there’s a big sign on the street saying, ‘please help yourself’,
then me or somebody else would go and help themselves.”

 

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Ed Blount, executive director of CSFME, reacts to the €150 billion “Cum-ex II Papers” controversy, as reported on October 21st.  Ed was the lead investigator on our 2010 Empty Voting project and testifying expert in the $450 million Lehman unsecured creditors vs. IRS suit, as well as two dozen litigation and compliance matters in securities finance since the onset of the credit crisis.

 

Q.        What would you say to a judge hearing this case?

A.         He’s not a trader. Criminals like Shah do not meet threshold standards for markets.  He’s just a thief.

 

            Just because the money is lying in the middle of the street is no defense for theft. As a society and an industry, we reject that premise. Money is never abandoned in the real world.

            We’re discussing standards for acceptable market behavior, and Shah is responding with a fairy tale, just like a rogue trader explaining away the fact that his books won’t balance.

            Civil society cannot tolerate Shah’s behavior, much less his pyramid manipulations. Securities finance has an existential risk, but there is a serious reputational risk here for all financial institutions. Borrowing pension assets to siphon from a government treasury, no matter how clever, is just as evil as stealing from its social safety nets.

          We all have to repay in taxes the money they steal. Real traders create wealth; they don’t steal it. We don’t need legal language to describe a thief.

 

Q.        How can we expose rogue traders like Mr. Shah in the future?

A.        Strip away their cover.

 

            Just like pickpockets, rogue traders work in places that are very busy with lots of distractions.

            Record dates are popular because of the many positioning trades made in advance of the entitlement postings. After record date, reversals may truly be as they appear, unwindings of dividend capture or similar legitimate trades. But some will be tax-driven, without economic substance. That’s what we’re looking for.

            If we can scan and tag the legitimate, socially benign trades, tax auditors will have fewer left to examine in our search for the fraudulent trades. Rogues, as a result, will have fewer places to hide.

 

Q.        What then?

A.         Look for signs of desperation or excess in the rest.

 

            Fees are a good tell. When Bear Stearns was failing, their cage managers would pay any price for liquidity.

            Collateral is another. Lehman’s “Repo 105” trades were overcollateralized to appeal to unsuspecting counterparties. But it sent a signal to the Market Posse that Lehman’s securitization pipeline was slowing, and their liabilities were coming due. I later described those “Liability Dynamics” for Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and other distressed firms in the RMA Journal.

            In particular, I wrote, look for evidence of distress in the form of unusual margins, positive and negative, in the remaining trades.

            Then audit the outliers.

 

Q.        Where is the data for that analysis?

A.         Some of it is available from vendors, and other useful data can be derived from regulatory filings. Service providers have most of the data, but it’s spread out.

 

            Commercial data vendors such as FIS ASTEC, S&P Global (IHS Markit), and Datalend all have the ability to look for outlying loans and collateral. However, those vendors don’t have access to the Know Your Customer” (KYC) profiles, contracts, trust indentures, and other policy documents that guide and constrain a trading desk. And data vendors must always keep in mind their own business models. The profit opportunity from surveillance may not be as appealing as other areas into which their resources can be directed.

            Regulatory reports, like those required by the European regulations SFTR and MiFID II, can be foundational to the analysis. There’s now an enormous data lake of details on loans from the summer of 2020, when SFTR went live for securities loans.

 

Q.        Can’t government agencies use that data to catch rogues and fraudsters?

A.         They’re certainly trying, but they also have limits, both in reach and resources.

 

            Government agencies cannot exceed their jurisdictions, except with the cooperation of foreign agencies willing to share intelligence. Foreign agencies might want to help, but their own regulations constrain them. Some of the documents they would need are firewalled in other agencies. Only the actual asset owners can access all the records required, either for compliance or surveillance. But even if the foreign KYC documents and legs of the trade were known, domestic regulators would have to revise their data models to build or manage an account-level registry for cross-border loans.

           

Q.        As you say, Banking itself has serious reputational risk in this scandal. Are existing bank systems equipped to expose the rogues?

A.        Banks have great systems, but they’re not designed for surveillance.

 

            Compliance systems are regularly upgraded to shadow changing regulations. But there are very few regulations in the cross-border markets. Any systems to track best practices would require a redesign. Bank legacy systems are excellent for the work they do, but they are often two or three generations old.

            It should be no surprise that regulators, led by ESMA, are pressing banks to build distributed ledger-based (DLT) infrastructures that can be used for market surveillance. The 2016 EU directive to disclose loan records by the Securities Financing Transaction Regulation (SFTR) was the opening gambit by regulators. Others have taken up the challenge. For example, compliance consultancies are exploring the use of blockchains and smart contracts to find fraudster networks that are operating in the covid-welfare distribution space. Some of those techniques may be useful.

 

Q.        How can all that data be compiled?

A.         Forensic and data analysts are very experienced in creating specialized databases.

 

            For the Wells Fargo account-opening fraud, the forensic auditors at FTI Consulting, Inc. reportedly analyzed 35 million documents and unstructured data from more than 300 custodians. Their report to the independent board members concluded that “events show that a strong centralized risk function was most suited to the effective management of risk.”

            That’s what securities finance needs now: a centralized loan database and registry to minimize the entire financial sector’s reputational risk from cross-border stock loan frauds.

 

Q.        What about the privacy and confidentiality issues?

A.         Bitcoin brought encryption into the mainstream, and Facebook’s profiling algorithms pushed data trusts into the spotlight.  Let’s use the new DLT tech if it survives testing.

 

            Traders are rightly concerned about exposing positions to raids in the GameStop squeeze era. I think that can be solved by lags and by puzzles. That is, if we are only building a compliance filter for banks, not a surveillance tool for regulators, there is no time sensitivity for the loan postings. A three-month posting lag would protect trading confidentiality but still be sufficiently current to filter the tax auditors’ screens for suspicious loans. Encryption can protect sensitive fields in the records, creating puzzles that defy access without the private keys.

            For asset managers and owners, a data trust can provide a legal framework to protect the resources used to validate borrower strategies and even to monitor style drift. Data trusts are a just-in-time solution for this problem. Let’s use the new tools available and reassure asset owners about the social propriety of their loans -- and let’s give banks an ESG feather for their bonnets.

 

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) has named “Data Trusts” as one of the “10 Breakthrough Technologies of 2021”, along with Messenger RNA vaccines, lithium-metal batteries, digital contact tracing and Tik-Tok’s feed algorithms.
 
 

Q.        Your old firm, ASTEC Analytics, created the first benchmarking systems for securities loans in the 1990s. Can’t a powerful database like that do the job?

A.         Not likely. Purpose-built databases are inadequate for surveillance work.

 

            I’m not privy to the tech just introduced in Lending Pit II, but, as a rule, vendor systems in securities finance were optimized for benchmarking. Their table structures, key fields, and SQL queries weren’t designed for surveillance or even for compliance. However, the new distributed tech of blockchains and shared ledgers offers data scientists a fresh start and may well be flexible enough to platform the analytics. Down the road, smart contracts can help banks to sort through the data and tag suspicious trades for further inspection. That level of functionality wasn’t in my original design specs for the Lending Pit.

 

 Q.       Is this the project that brought you out of ‘semi-retirement’?

A.         Yes, I was intrigued to answer the critics, who have become quite vocal.

 

            Those who say that securities finance is a platform for widespread fraud and manipulation, where thieves routinely deploy the assets of widows and orphans to steal from government treasuries, are wrong. There are also those who claim that proxy votes are being unknowingly sold to hedge funds. Every industry has a few bad apples. But the men and women in securities finance, by and large, are honest and dedicated stewards of the assets they’re given to manage.

            We can create an answer to the critics’ charges of malfeasance, just as we did ten years ago when we educated the regulators about the mistakes of the empty voting critics. Personally, I’m not interested in ancient history. I’m sure others are working diligently on researching old loans. But I would like to leave a way for the new loans to be seen as legitimate, so the field is accepted as honest and I don’t have to scratch off the last 30 years of my CV.

 

Q.        Will we work with RMA, SIFMA, and DTCC again, as during the Empty Voting project?

A.         We will work with any organization that can help the Market Posse.

 

           We will certainly work again with trade groups and industry utilities and with our forensic consulting colleagues and the platform vendors for distributed ledger technologies.

My own history working with industry utilities goes back to 1974 when I opened the first ADR account at the brand-new Depository Trust Company. That’s me on the left, in my double-knit pinstriped suit, proudly showing our pin-feed position report to Bill Spencer, president of First National City Bank; to Dick Banks, my boss; and to our DTC rep. NSCC was one of ASTEC’s first consulting clients, for a technical assessment of challenges onboarding the custodian banks into the brokers’ Continuous Net Settlement system. In fact, the first time that I ever saw a personal computer was a Heathkit that Jack Nelson, NSCC’s first president, had on his conference table in 1982.

More on that another time, perhaps.

 

Q.        Who else will be helping the Market Posse?

A.        In our next blog, I will introduce Eric Poer, lead forensic accounting partner at FTI Consulting, to explain how he and his team exposed the largest consumer fraud in U.S. history.

 

           FTI Consulting, on behalf of the independent directors on the Wells Fargo board, was engaged by the law firm of Shearman & Sterling to organize and examine data held in scores of systems going back many years. Eric Poer will explain how his team approached the challenge of collecting, analyzing, and collating the data to determine the breadth of the sales practice issues and determine their origins. FTI’s analysis was conducted in the cloud in virtual sandboxes, then collated with unstructured data (i.e., emails, interviews, etc.) and summarized in expert reports and exhibits.

 

          Eric, with 25 years of experience in regulatory inquiries, investigations, and disputes, was also my analytical partner in our support of the tax claims pursued in federal bankruptcy court by Lehman’s unsecured creditors committee. Together, we will explain how we mapped the cross-border loans by Lehman’s subsidiaries to show their economic substance and confirm the legitimacy of the $450 million in foreign tax credits that the U.S. Internal Revenue Service had disallowed.

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The CSFME’s Regulatory Outreach Programs

Regulatory reform has become a collaborative process. Where once market supervisors promulgated rules without regard for input from practitioners, today’s reform process has evolved into a dialogue of mutual respect for the opinions of all stakeholders in the capital markets. The process of regulatory outreach has become embodied in virtually every developed markets in the world.

The CSFME has adopted a role of facilitating this collaborative dialogue at all stages of the professional contribution process. Starting with students’ contributions to published commentary letters, through panel presentation and webinars, right up to trade association initiatives, the CSFME provides assistance through education, data compilation, analysis and commentary for some of the most pressing issues in contemporary markets.

DLT and Preferred Securities Financing

We believe the widespread use of encrypted third-party ledgers, blockchains, and smart contracts (i.e., DLT) is inevitable in securities finance, and that those technologies will permit lending agents to offer new revenue opportunities to their clients. Among these, we believe that certain agents will use DLT to help their lenders expand their loan books by opening their lendable portfolios on a preferential basis to the hedge funds in which they've already invested, as well as to other trusted counterparties, a concept we have dubbed, “Preferred Securities Financing.”  

CSFME is openly soliciting participation in a research initiative to assess the potential benefits to securities lenders from the use of DLT and data sourced from new regulatory disclosures. Specifically, our research will focus on how DLT, blockchain, and smart contracts can facilitate Preferred Securities Financing.  Learn More about our DLT Securities Finance Initiative

Research and Analysis of the Effects of Financial Regulatory Reforms

Given the sweeping changes in financial market regulation following the financial crisis, CSFME has turned its focus to questions relating to to how these changes are affecting the risks and economics of bank activities. The purpose of the Center’s research in this area is to foster sound policymaking and effective regulation with minimal adverse and unintended consequences. CSFME studies supervision and regulation of global financial institutions, the effects of reregulation on the global financial industry, optimal roles and methods of regulation in securities markets, corporate governance at financial institutions, and the most effective metrics and methods of data collection for understanding and measuring the effects of regulations on the global financial landscape. 

Lately, in response to a call from the FDIC for research on financial sector policy and regulation, the Center submitted a paper modeling the indirect costs to markets of bank regulatory reform.  The paper critiques regulators’ models for assessing these costs, and provides empirically-based suggestions for a more complete dynamic model of the long-term effect of bank capital reform.  Mindful of the Basel Committee's ongoing reviews of modeling tools, i.e., May 2012 and March 2016, the Center's critique is intended as a constructive addition to the holistic conceptual base of the regulatory reforms.

The Center also continues to provide input on regulatory proposals.

In March of 2016, CSFME submitted a comment letter to the Bank for International Settlement's (BIS) December 2015 consultative document regarding step in risk.  While supporting generally the goals of the Basel Committee to minimize the potential systemic implications resulting from situations where banks may choose to provide financial support during periods of financial stress to entities beyond or in the absence of any contractual obligations, the Center expressed some concerns and offered some suggestions regarding the approach taken by the Consultation. Drawing on practical experience, the Center offered an example from the trade finance sector supporting its belief that the nature of step-in risk may be one example of an acceptable, non-diversifiable exposure, given the potential positives for the economy at large.

In February 2015, CSFME submitted a comment letter in response to the Financial Stability Board’s November 2014 consultative document, Standards and Processes for Global Securities Financing Data Collection and Aggregation. In its letter, the Center identified additional metrics that may be necessary to assess properly the risk of collateral fire sales associated with securities lending transactions.  In particular, CSFME asserted that FSB and sovereign regulators must expand the data initiative beyond position aggregates, to include risk mitigation resources as well as termination activity.

Students Learn to Evaluate and Contribute to the Reform Process

As the level of intensity surrounding the reform process continued to build in 2013, the CSFME began to bring a fresh perspective to the reform process. By working with finance students and the US regulatory agencies, CSFME hoped to challenge the settled views of stakeholder by introducing the views of those whose careers would be shaped by the outcome of the reforms.

In the spring of 2013, a select group of Fordham University economics students met in Washington with officials at the U.S. Treasury, Office of Management and Budget, Federal Reserve Board, and the Securities and Exchange Commission. The CSFME helped arrange the meetings and funded the logistics. By all accounts, the experience was very positive for students and regulators alike.

Buidling upon the success of the 2013 pilot program, in 2014, both Fordham and the CSFME decided to expand the outreach program and formalized the Regulatory Outreach for Student Education program as the ROSE program. Honor students in finance and economics were selected by the deans of four schools within the university: the Graduate School of Business Administration, Fordham College at Lincoln Center, the Gabelli School of Business, and Fordham College at Rose Hill. The students were organized into four teams representing their schools. The CSFME selected a contemporary issue of career significance, the Financial Stability Board’s Consultative Document on G-SIFI designation of non-bank, non-insurer financial institutions. Each team was charged with studying the issues in debate, then presenting their opinions in the manner of a formal comment letter to the FSB. Over four months, the students reviewed earlier opinion pieces, met with practitioners and regulators, and then submitted their opinions. Without influencing their opinions, the CSFME arranged access to research materials and opinion leaders, then reviewed their letters and, as appropriate, recommended submission on university letterhead. In April, 2014, the four teams’ letters were published by the FSB on its website. In recent memory, no university had ever had one letter, much less four, published on a regulatory website. To finalize the 2014 ROSE program, the CSFME arranged for all four teams to present their opinions to the key regulators at the Federal Reserve Board and the SEC in Washington, D.C. The day of meetings ended with regulators’ praise at the degree to which the students had understood the issues and presented their opinions clearly.

One student team even offered suggestions that regulators had not previously considered and praised for their creativity. “We always know what the trade groups will say, but you brought a fresh perspective.” That team, Fordham College at Lincoln Center, was awarded the 2014 ROSE Award for Analytic Excellence. In retrospect. each student completed the program with a credit that will not only endure on their resumes but also contribute to the evolution of the financial markets through the Twenty First Century.

In 2015 and 2016, Fordham formalized the ROSE Program as a for-credit course in their curriculum. The focus of the 2016 ROSE Program was the Bank for International Settlement's December 2015 consultative document proposing a preliminary framework for identifying, assessing and addressing step-in risk potentially embedded in banks' relationships with shadow banking entities.  Five teams of graduate and undergraduate students in economics, finance, accounting, management, and law researched and drafted comment letters on the consultation and submitted their letters to a panel of distinguished industry judges.  After reviewing each excellent submission, the judges then one winning letter to be presented at a visit to the Federal Reserve Bank on April 27, 2016. The winning team's letter was submitted in full to the BIS, along with a summary of the key ideas from the letters from each of the other four teams, and the submission was published on the organization's website with those of the consultation's other commenters.   All five teams of Fordham Scholars visited Washington, DC on April 27, 2016 and met with officials at the Fed, Treasury Department, and FINRA.  

Institutional Securities Lenders respond to Academic Criticisms

In 2006 the Center was created, initially for the purpose of testing academic criticisms of the securities lending markets. With funding and data support from the Risk Management Association, CSFME found “no strong evidence to conclude that securities lending programs have been used to any great extent to manipulate proxy votes or exercise undue influence on Corporate Governance issues.” Our study also found that “broker borrowbacks” had contributed to spikes in lending activity around record date – the same phenomenon that the academics had misinterpreted as evidence of hedge fund manipulation – due to the efforts of brokers to meet recall notices from securities lenders. In effect, the brokers were scrambling to acquire votes for their customers, not building positions to swing corporate elections. The academics had fatally misinterpreted their findings!

Ed Blount of CSFME testified at the SEC’s Roundtable on the results of the research in September, 2009. Then, the CSFME white paper, published in 2010, was submitted to the SEC as an attachment in response to a consultative document on the “Proxy Plumbing” process. As a result of the Center’s contribution to the collaborative process, the misguided call for reform of securities lending began to subside. Once again, securities borrowers were fairly recognized to be honest brokers in the corporate governance arena.

Securities Lenders consider new means to retain their Voting Rights

In a follow-up to the Empty Voting project (“Borrowed Proxy Abuse” as it came to be known), the CSFME responded in 2011 to requests by the participating securities lenders, by turning its attention to ways in which those lenders might be able to retain their corporate governance rights, while still benefiting from the income attributable to their securities loans. After all, as many studies have found, securities lending contributes significantly to the efficiency of market operations. Why should lenders be forced to choose between their loan fees and fiduciary duties to vote their shares, especially if they are contributing to market efficiency?? With independent funding, the CSFME retained attorneys from two prestigious Washington D.C. law firms, Stradley Ronon and Sidley Austin, to investigate the legal underpinnings to market practices which force pensions, mutual funds, insurers and other institutional securities lenders to give up their voting rights when they lend portfolio securities. In practice, margin customers of brokers also lend their securities, yet they usually retain voting rights -- and most of them aren’t even long-term beneficial owners. Both groups of beneficial owners retain dividend rights, so why, institutional investors asked, shouldn’t institutions also keep their voting rights? With the benefit of exhaustive legal research, CSFME filed a petition with the Securities & Exchange Commission to initiate a pilot program to test new market procedures by which recently-introduced efficiencies in market operations might permit lender to retain votes.  Learn more about Paradoxical Erosion of Corporate Governance

In 2013, the SEC approved that pilot program, largely in response to the encouraging recommendations of the International Corporate Governance Association, as well as the California State Teachers Retirement System and the Florida State Board of Administration.

That pilot was initiated in 2014. Simultaneously, the CSFME began to apply the results to new initiatives in Canada and Switzerland, where the pressure to meet fiduciary voting obligations was intensifying.  More about Full Entitlement Voting



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