Outreach Blog

Monday, November 15, 2021

New Trends in Data Ownership

How Data Trusts Can Transform Securities Finance.


Author: David Schwartz J.D. CPA

Certain challenges in securities finance can only be met with better data and newer data models. Market regulators now coping with investor demands for ESG-compliance will have to monitor the disclosures of regulated entities by combing through vast pools of stock loan and proxy voting data. Bank custodians and brokers, if tasked with validating the social propriety of their stock loans, will have to dive deep into customer profile data, deeper than either regulators or vendors can today access efficiently.

Distributed ledger technologies may offer solutions -- if that confidential data can be mobilized and still protected at the same time. We believe the use of data trusts can solve that confidentiality problem for both regulators and market participants. The time has come for beneficial owners, borrowers, and their service providers to bring their transaction details and unstructured policy-level records under one roof. 

The key attributes of a data trust are ownership and control.

A data trust is an innovation listed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology as one of the ten most significant breakthrough technologies of 2021. Its legal structure fuses contemporary notions of privacy controls on "Big Data" with traditional trust laws and fiduciary duties. [1]

Every data trust's central organizing principal is that the trustees are instructed to use their data assets for the owners’ exclusive benefit. To achieve that purpose, the trust owners define rules for data usage. With those policies in place, the governing body takes responsibility for enforcing access security. As in most institutional trusts, a board of trustees usually outsources the asset (data) safekeeping and delegates its management to trusted contractors.

In the near future, forensic and data analysts will use these data assets within trusts to deploy smart contracts to evaluate credit access and perform otherwise impossible tasks. Their algorithms and oracles will help to categorize loans, rate policy documents, and then post encrypted transaction records to shared ledgers.

Securities loan data is an inherently valuable asset.

Transaction feeds from service providers provide the raw data for commercial benchmarking vendors. Today, lenders have no choice but to give data away to those vendors - then buy it back through "peer reviews." Moreover, much of the data's value is left on the table. Why? Because most of the transaction and policy data remains siloed in proprietary systems that do not share well.

Data feeds can become powerful tools if the new distributed ledger technologies are employed in its usage. What if that siloed data can be anonymized, then securely combined with other funds' data? The resulting data collection could span the entire industry and support hitherto unimaginable risk management tools. Such a compilation would then also enable the owners to maximize their own data assets’ value without sacrificing their intellectual property rights or revealing their competitive strategies.[2]

Both the public and private sectors are embracing data trusts.

Many data trusts have been government sponsored, like Virginia's Commonwealth Data Trust.  With over 2,000 operational data systems, Virginia's data trust controls everything from library data to crime, corrections, EMS, hospital, patient, and aviation records. Similarly, private data trusts such as that of the Mayo Clinic are designed to collect all "data from patient care, education, research, and administrative, transactional systems, [that is] organized to support information retrieval, business intelligence, and high-level decision making."[3]

Although a data trust for securities lenders and borrowers would be an original application of the concept, the European Mastercard data trust may provide a useful precedent. Truata was formed to anonymize customer transaction data for analysis and compliance with the EU's strict consumer privacy regulations. Truata's beneficiaries are competitors, just like securities finance market participants, so they rely on robust usage and encryption policies that make it difficult for owners to use the data as a weapon against one another.

Data owners design their own data trusts.

A data trust doesn't necessarily have to take the form of a trust in the legal sense. It can be a limited liability company, partnership, or corporation, whatever legal form the data owners decide works best for their purpose. The same is true for the trust's governance structure. The data owners have a great deal of flexibility in structuring the trust, so its governance and management reflect the consensus of the data owners and their purpose for combining their data. Despite this inherent flexibility, there are some basic things every data trust must have in place, regardless of the legal or contractual methods employed to achieve its purpose.

Why not use commercial data vendors' systems? They aren't equipped for compliance and surveillance work. As we've discussed previously, the securities finance databases of leading data service providers were designed as long as 20 years ago, mainly for performance benchmarking. The lending data these firms receive from intermediaries and funds are insufficiently granular to be used either for cross-border compliance monitoring or for proxy voting metrics. Their systems were not designed to hold the large amounts of raw and unstructured transaction data that will be necessary to solve the challenges for securities finance. 

The “give to get” model has a new competitor: the scalable, encrypted data trust.

An industry-wide securities lending data trust would release beneficial owners from the cycle of supplying data to aggregator firms, who then process it and sell it back to them. By contributing to a data trust, the lenders and borrowers would continue to benefit from benchmarking services from vendors, but by asserting ownership of their data, they could also use their resources to prove compliance with market practices and regulations. 

A voluntary industry-wide securities lending data trust would provide a scalable alternative to today's ad hoc and incomplete data sharing. Under common ownership, and employing common rules for encryption, data security, privacy, anonymization, and confidentiality, securities lending market participants can finally get the full value out of their data resources.  

In Part II, we’ll discuss in more detail how securities lending industry participants can see real value by contributing to a data trust and how a data trust can foster best practices and ease regulatory burdens by automating the work of regulators. 


Notes:

[1] A "data trust" is established when separate entities place data under the control of a board of trustees (or other governing body) with a fiduciary duty to manage and safeguard the data in the interest of the data owners. 

[2] Data can also be a weapon that can be used by competitors and by litigious investors. A carefully crafted data trust can ensure that data is properly controlled and handled with the utmost care and discretion. 

[3] Other examples of data trusts include:

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The CSFME’s Regulatory Outreach Programs

Regulatory reform has become a collaborative process. Where once market supervisors promulgated rules without regard for input from practitioners, today’s reform process has evolved into a dialogue of mutual respect for the opinions of all stakeholders in the capital markets. The process of regulatory outreach has become embodied in virtually every developed markets in the world.

The CSFME has adopted a role of facilitating this collaborative dialogue at all stages of the professional contribution process. Starting with students’ contributions to published commentary letters, through panel presentation and webinars, right up to trade association initiatives, the CSFME provides assistance through education, data compilation, analysis and commentary for some of the most pressing issues in contemporary markets.

DLT and Preferred Securities Financing

We believe the widespread use of encrypted third-party ledgers, blockchains, and smart contracts (i.e., DLT) is inevitable in securities finance, and that those technologies will permit lending agents to offer new revenue opportunities to their clients. Among these, we believe that certain agents will use DLT to help their lenders expand their loan books by opening their lendable portfolios on a preferential basis to the hedge funds in which they've already invested, as well as to other trusted counterparties, a concept we have dubbed, “Preferred Securities Financing.”  

CSFME is openly soliciting participation in a research initiative to assess the potential benefits to securities lenders from the use of DLT and data sourced from new regulatory disclosures. Specifically, our research will focus on how DLT, blockchain, and smart contracts can facilitate Preferred Securities Financing.  Learn More about our DLT Securities Finance Initiative

Research and Analysis of the Effects of Financial Regulatory Reforms

Given the sweeping changes in financial market regulation following the financial crisis, CSFME has turned its focus to questions relating to to how these changes are affecting the risks and economics of bank activities. The purpose of the Center’s research in this area is to foster sound policymaking and effective regulation with minimal adverse and unintended consequences. CSFME studies supervision and regulation of global financial institutions, the effects of reregulation on the global financial industry, optimal roles and methods of regulation in securities markets, corporate governance at financial institutions, and the most effective metrics and methods of data collection for understanding and measuring the effects of regulations on the global financial landscape. 

Lately, in response to a call from the FDIC for research on financial sector policy and regulation, the Center submitted a paper modeling the indirect costs to markets of bank regulatory reform.  The paper critiques regulators’ models for assessing these costs, and provides empirically-based suggestions for a more complete dynamic model of the long-term effect of bank capital reform.  Mindful of the Basel Committee's ongoing reviews of modeling tools, i.e., May 2012 and March 2016, the Center's critique is intended as a constructive addition to the holistic conceptual base of the regulatory reforms.

The Center also continues to provide input on regulatory proposals.

In March of 2016, CSFME submitted a comment letter to the Bank for International Settlement's (BIS) December 2015 consultative document regarding step in risk.  While supporting generally the goals of the Basel Committee to minimize the potential systemic implications resulting from situations where banks may choose to provide financial support during periods of financial stress to entities beyond or in the absence of any contractual obligations, the Center expressed some concerns and offered some suggestions regarding the approach taken by the Consultation. Drawing on practical experience, the Center offered an example from the trade finance sector supporting its belief that the nature of step-in risk may be one example of an acceptable, non-diversifiable exposure, given the potential positives for the economy at large.

In February 2015, CSFME submitted a comment letter in response to the Financial Stability Board’s November 2014 consultative document, Standards and Processes for Global Securities Financing Data Collection and Aggregation. In its letter, the Center identified additional metrics that may be necessary to assess properly the risk of collateral fire sales associated with securities lending transactions.  In particular, CSFME asserted that FSB and sovereign regulators must expand the data initiative beyond position aggregates, to include risk mitigation resources as well as termination activity.

Students Learn to Evaluate and Contribute to the Reform Process

As the level of intensity surrounding the reform process continued to build in 2013, the CSFME began to bring a fresh perspective to the reform process. By working with finance students and the US regulatory agencies, CSFME hoped to challenge the settled views of stakeholder by introducing the views of those whose careers would be shaped by the outcome of the reforms.

In the spring of 2013, a select group of Fordham University economics students met in Washington with officials at the U.S. Treasury, Office of Management and Budget, Federal Reserve Board, and the Securities and Exchange Commission. The CSFME helped arrange the meetings and funded the logistics. By all accounts, the experience was very positive for students and regulators alike.

Buidling upon the success of the 2013 pilot program, in 2014, both Fordham and the CSFME decided to expand the outreach program and formalized the Regulatory Outreach for Student Education program as the ROSE program. Honor students in finance and economics were selected by the deans of four schools within the university: the Graduate School of Business Administration, Fordham College at Lincoln Center, the Gabelli School of Business, and Fordham College at Rose Hill. The students were organized into four teams representing their schools. The CSFME selected a contemporary issue of career significance, the Financial Stability Board’s Consultative Document on G-SIFI designation of non-bank, non-insurer financial institutions. Each team was charged with studying the issues in debate, then presenting their opinions in the manner of a formal comment letter to the FSB. Over four months, the students reviewed earlier opinion pieces, met with practitioners and regulators, and then submitted their opinions. Without influencing their opinions, the CSFME arranged access to research materials and opinion leaders, then reviewed their letters and, as appropriate, recommended submission on university letterhead. In April, 2014, the four teams’ letters were published by the FSB on its website. In recent memory, no university had ever had one letter, much less four, published on a regulatory website. To finalize the 2014 ROSE program, the CSFME arranged for all four teams to present their opinions to the key regulators at the Federal Reserve Board and the SEC in Washington, D.C. The day of meetings ended with regulators’ praise at the degree to which the students had understood the issues and presented their opinions clearly.

One student team even offered suggestions that regulators had not previously considered and praised for their creativity. “We always know what the trade groups will say, but you brought a fresh perspective.” That team, Fordham College at Lincoln Center, was awarded the 2014 ROSE Award for Analytic Excellence. In retrospect. each student completed the program with a credit that will not only endure on their resumes but also contribute to the evolution of the financial markets through the Twenty First Century.

In 2015 and 2016, Fordham formalized the ROSE Program as a for-credit course in their curriculum. The focus of the 2016 ROSE Program was the Bank for International Settlement's December 2015 consultative document proposing a preliminary framework for identifying, assessing and addressing step-in risk potentially embedded in banks' relationships with shadow banking entities.  Five teams of graduate and undergraduate students in economics, finance, accounting, management, and law researched and drafted comment letters on the consultation and submitted their letters to a panel of distinguished industry judges.  After reviewing each excellent submission, the judges then one winning letter to be presented at a visit to the Federal Reserve Bank on April 27, 2016. The winning team's letter was submitted in full to the BIS, along with a summary of the key ideas from the letters from each of the other four teams, and the submission was published on the organization's website with those of the consultation's other commenters.   All five teams of Fordham Scholars visited Washington, DC on April 27, 2016 and met with officials at the Fed, Treasury Department, and FINRA.  

Institutional Securities Lenders respond to Academic Criticisms

In 2006 the Center was created, initially for the purpose of testing academic criticisms of the securities lending markets. With funding and data support from the Risk Management Association, CSFME found “no strong evidence to conclude that securities lending programs have been used to any great extent to manipulate proxy votes or exercise undue influence on Corporate Governance issues.” Our study also found that “broker borrowbacks” had contributed to spikes in lending activity around record date – the same phenomenon that the academics had misinterpreted as evidence of hedge fund manipulation – due to the efforts of brokers to meet recall notices from securities lenders. In effect, the brokers were scrambling to acquire votes for their customers, not building positions to swing corporate elections. The academics had fatally misinterpreted their findings!

Ed Blount of CSFME testified at the SEC’s Roundtable on the results of the research in September, 2009. Then, the CSFME white paper, published in 2010, was submitted to the SEC as an attachment in response to a consultative document on the “Proxy Plumbing” process. As a result of the Center’s contribution to the collaborative process, the misguided call for reform of securities lending began to subside. Once again, securities borrowers were fairly recognized to be honest brokers in the corporate governance arena.

Securities Lenders consider new means to retain their Voting Rights

In a follow-up to the Empty Voting project (“Borrowed Proxy Abuse” as it came to be known), the CSFME responded in 2011 to requests by the participating securities lenders, by turning its attention to ways in which those lenders might be able to retain their corporate governance rights, while still benefiting from the income attributable to their securities loans. After all, as many studies have found, securities lending contributes significantly to the efficiency of market operations. Why should lenders be forced to choose between their loan fees and fiduciary duties to vote their shares, especially if they are contributing to market efficiency?? With independent funding, the CSFME retained attorneys from two prestigious Washington D.C. law firms, Stradley Ronon and Sidley Austin, to investigate the legal underpinnings to market practices which force pensions, mutual funds, insurers and other institutional securities lenders to give up their voting rights when they lend portfolio securities. In practice, margin customers of brokers also lend their securities, yet they usually retain voting rights -- and most of them aren’t even long-term beneficial owners. Both groups of beneficial owners retain dividend rights, so why, institutional investors asked, shouldn’t institutions also keep their voting rights? With the benefit of exhaustive legal research, CSFME filed a petition with the Securities & Exchange Commission to initiate a pilot program to test new market procedures by which recently-introduced efficiencies in market operations might permit lender to retain votes.  Learn more about Paradoxical Erosion of Corporate Governance

In 2013, the SEC approved that pilot program, largely in response to the encouraging recommendations of the International Corporate Governance Association, as well as the California State Teachers Retirement System and the Florida State Board of Administration.

That pilot was initiated in 2014. Simultaneously, the CSFME began to apply the results to new initiatives in Canada and Switzerland, where the pressure to meet fiduciary voting obligations was intensifying.  More about Full Entitlement Voting



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